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Abstract
This paper explores and challenges the development strategies of Rafael Correa in Ecuador and,
more generally, the new Latin American left through the Yasuní-ITT case study. Claiming to
implement a post-neoliberal development model that stands to uphold the principles of buen
vivir, post-neoliberalism, and the 2008 Ecuadorean constitution, the Yasuní-ITT case study
seems less like a commitment to the rights of the Pachamama and the rights of indigenous tribes,
and more like a political tactic, the creation of a hollow narrative that positions the new Latin
American left as anti-Northern, anti- IMF, and as “post-neoliberal.” In this thesis, I examine
different data from the World Bank, US Energy Information Administration (EIA), IndexMundi,
the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the Ecuadorean
government, and other sources in order to determine changes under the Correa administration in
oil and development strategies. I also use experts, and their research to drive my argument and
further explore twenty-first century socialism. These sources and data will help prove that the
Correa administration, and other Latin American leftist governments, are not providing a viable
“post-neoliberal development strategy” but rather that the systems we see in place are a form of
neo-extractivism, a system that continues to exploit hydrocarbons but with a larger state role.
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Executive Summary
In 2007, President Rafael Correa, a twenty-first century socialist, presented the
revolutionary and controversial ITT proposal to the General Assembly of the United Nations
(Rival, 2012, p. 7). In this innovative initiative, the Ecuadorean government would pledge to
never drill in the ITT oil block of Yasuní Park. This initiative would protect close to 5 million
hectares of biodiversity within the block and the members of indigenous communities living
there. In exchange for this protection, Ecuador looked to the international community to
contribute funds in order to offset the economic losses of not drilling in this region. In this
proposal Correa estimated that the oil reserve in the ITT block, if drilled, would earn the country
a projected 8 billion dollars, but only asked the international community for 3.6 billion in
compensation (Greco-Stoner, 2013). However this proposal failed to raise the money needed.
After this declared failure of the ITT proposal, the National Assembly, dominated by the
Alianza Pais party (the party of Rafael Correa) in October 2013 agreed to drill in the IshpingoTambococha-Tiputini block (Alvaro, 2014).The decision to allow the state oil company
(Petroamazonas) to drill in this block has been controversial not only for environmental reasons,
but also because part of the ITT block is located in an area of Yasuní (ZITT) called the
Intangible Zone set aside and protected for the Tagaeri and Taromenane, the two indigenous
communities living in voluntary isolation.
This controversial decision to drill hydrocarbons in Yasuní National Park near the ZITT
zone, after the failure of the ITT proposal, triggers many questions about President Rafael
Correa’s leftist government. What is new about twenty-first century socialism’s approach to
hydrocarbons and its insertion into the global market? Though twenty-first century socialism has
had a change in social policies, how has that been reflected in its economic model, especially
iv

regarding oil development? How does the Yasuní case study reflect the contradictions of twentyfirst century socialism?
Twenty-first century socialism is a “new” movement in Latin America that represents the
political left. In Ecuador, it meant a commitment to “buen vivir” which means good living. Buen
vivir represents a commitment to a transition away from extractive industries, redistribution of
these rents in social welfare programs, respecting indigenous communities and their rights, and
the protection of the environment.
However despite changing legal frameworks and promises from the Correa
administration, the development strategy of twenty-first century socialism does not clearly reflect
the values of buen vivir. In this thesis I discuss how the Correa administration’s inability to
diversify and move away from extractive policies is inhibiting its ability to truly achieve buen
vivir. I question what is truly different about Ecuador’s extractive policy under twenty-first
century socialism, and come to understand that the development strategy is not a commitment to
buen vivir or post-neoliberalist strategies, but simply a neo-extractivist model. Neo-extractivism
still promotes old extractive policies, but it differs in that it gives the state greater control over
industry. Through policies of nationalization and social welfare programs, the state can use
petroleum profits to “redistribute” and tackle poverty.
Understanding twenty-first century socialism’s development model is important for
moving forward. By understanding President Rafael Correa’s narratives, and comparing them to
the realities of oil extraction policies, one can understand the steps needed to move forward to
truly obtain a post-neoliberal, post-extractive development economy. By deconstructing the
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careful narrative the Correa administration has created for itself, one can begin to understand the
truth of such policies and determine the fate of twenty-first century socialism.
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Glossary of Terms
Twenty-first century socialism- is a “new” movement in Latin America that represents the
political left seen in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela
Intangible zone (ZITT) - area in Amazon Rainforest that prohibits extractive activities in an
effort to protect voluntarily isolated indigenous groups
Alianza Pais Party- a socialist political party in Ecuador led by Rafael Correa
Neoliberalism- a term referring to the world economic trend since the 80s that promotes trade
liberalization, deregulation, and privatization.
Post-neoliberalism- is an economic model that rejects traditional neoliberal ideas and policies
that plagued Latin America from the 80s on.
Neo-extractivism- is an economic system that prioritizes extractive activities with a large state
role
Buen vivir- a value that means to live in harmony with communities, oneself, and the living
environment
Pachamama- an indigenous concept of Mother Earth
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Preface
In 2005, the New York Times boldly announced to the Northern world “The Return of
the Latin American Left,” in which author, and former rightist Peruvian presidential candidate,
Álvaro Vargas Llosa declared “the Left is in power” (Vargas Llosa, 2005). This assertion was
made after the elections of leftist officials, first in Venezuela in 1999 with Hugo Chavez, and
then later with Brazil's Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003), and Uruguay's election of Tabaré
Vázquez (2005). Since then, the elections of both Evo Morales in Bolivia (2005), and Rafael
Correa in Ecuador (2006) have further defined this “new” political movement, deemed “Twentyfirst century socialism,” that stems from both the recent Chavez Bolivarian Revolution, and, as
Vargas Llosa hinted, deeply entrenched roots in the history of the Latin American Left (Vargas
Llosa, 2005). Twenty-first century socialism claims to have learned from “the mistakes of both
neoliberalism and twentieth-century socialism” in order to create a new and just political
economy (Kennemore and Weeks, 2011, p. 267). However, within the years of this system’s
existence more questions have arisen than have been answered on the construction of this
political theory, especially revolving around economic policies, globalization and extractivism.
In Ecuador, the Yasuní-ITT case is a complex issue that demonstrates the struggles of the new
left with development, oil policy, and global economic systems.

x

Chapter 1
Introduction

Yasuní National Park History
Ecuador is well-known for its beauty and diversity, both geographically and biologically,
housing numerous endemic species and sensitive ecological niches within its diverse biospheres.
Established in Ecuador in 1979, Yasuní National Park was created to protect one of these
biospheres: the Amazon Rainforest. Located in the far east of Ecuador, Yasuní National Park is
known for its extraordinary biodiversity and multiple indigenous groups. The park houses
indigenous groups such as the Huaorani people, and the Tagaeri and Taromenane, the last two
known indigenous groups in Ecuador who are living in voluntary isolation. The Tagaeri and
Taromenane live within the intangible zone, a protected area that prohibits extractive activity,
partially located in Yasuní National Park (see Fig. 1). The Tagaeri, a clan of Huaorani families,
retreated further into the Jungle in the 1960s (after the beginnings of oil development) into the
intangible zone in order to avoid contact and remain voluntarily isolated (Kuffner, 2008). The
Taromenane are a separate voluntarily isolated group not related to the Huaorani, though they
speak a similar language.
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Fig. 1 shows the position of Yasuní Park within Ecuador. It also depicts the location of the
intangible zone (ZITT) and the Huaorani Territory. It shows how part of the intangible zone is in
Yasuní Park (Ecuador Noticias, 2011).
However, Yasuní Park is not only known for its amazing biodiversity and for housing
multiple indigenous tribes, it has also become a political hotspot and place of conflict due to its
abundance of oil. The park houses the second largest oil reserve found in Ecuador, an estimated
800 million barrels, (20% of Ecuador’s reserves), in what is known as the Ishpingo Tambococha
Tiputini (ITT) block, or block 43 located within the park (The Guardian, 2013) (see Fig. 2). The
ITT block has recently been thrown into controversy as current Ecuadorean government officials
have recently decided to drill in this block.
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Fig. 2 shows the position of the ITT oil block within Yasuní National Park. (BBC News, 2008).
However, the conflict between oil development and protected areas is not new to Yasuní
Park. Starting in the 1970s, since the discovery of oil in the Ecuadorean Amazon, the conflict
between the environment and oil exploration has become a common theme for the eastern part of
this nation, with conflictual policies that seem to promote both agendas (Rival, 2012, p. 2). In
1986 exploration blocks 14 and 16 were carved out of Yasuní Park (see Fig. 3) (Rival, 2012, p.
4). This was controversial because it was the first hint that oil companies would soon be allowed
to drill in National Parks. Though initial Ecuadorean policies protected national parks from oil
exploration, this changed in 1999 with two policies written under President Jamil Mahuad’s
administration (Rival, 2012, p. 6). One law annulled the law that prevented oil development
within the park (Rival, 2012, p. 6). The other changed the Park’s status from a sanctuary to the
creation of the intangible zone (ZITT) that solely protects the lands of the two voluntarily
isolated groups (Rival, 2012, p. 6). These two decrees allowed for the development of oil blocks
within Yasuní Park, so long as it was outside of the intangible zone. It completely redefined the
conflict in Yasuní Ecuador, changing which lands were considered protected, 71% being the
zona intangible, and 29% of the lands which were considered oil territory (Rival, 2012, p. 6).
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These policies and prioritization of oil over the environment has allowed the current Yasuní
conflict to exist today.

Fig. 3 demonstrates the different oil blocks within Yasuní National Park (Pappalardo, S. E., De
Marchi, M., & Ferrarese, F. , 2013)
Yasuní-ITT Proposal
As current leftist President Rafael Correa (2007- ), a twenty-first century socialist, took
office, he made early efforts to strengthen the environmental policy surrounding Yasuní National
Park. He sought to protect the Ishpingo Tambococha Tiputini (ITT) oil block, sensitive for its
overlap with the intangible zone (see Fig. 3). In 2007, President Rafael Correa presented the
revolutionary and controversial ITT proposal to the General Assembly of the United Nations
4

(Rival, 2012, p. 7). Under this innovative initiative, the Ecuadorean government would pledge to
never drill in the ITT block and protect close to 5 million hectares of biodiversity within the
block and the members of indigenous communities living there. In exchange, however, they
looked to the international community to contribute funds in order to offset the economic losses
of not drilling in this region. Countries (and individual donors) could donate to the fund, thereby
preserving part of the park and fulfilling their commitment to the Kyoto Protocol. In the ITT
proposal President Correa estimated that the oil reserve in the ITT block, if drilled, would earn
the country a projected 8 billion dollars, but only asked the international community for 3.6
billion dollars in compensation (Greco-Stoner, 2013). The initiative proposed that over the
course of 13 years, these funds be raised from public and private institutions.
The initiative, originally drafted by activists in the 1990s, was hailed by
environmentalists for shifting the traditional relationship between environment and extractivism,
and for its commitment to protecting traditionally ignored indigenous groups. The ITT proposal
aligned with the goals of the newly drafted 2008 Constitution, written by the Correa
administration, that guaranteed rights to nature, and that forbade extractive activities in
voluntarily- isolated indigenous land. It was seen as the beginning of a revolution and a promise
to commit to the “Pachamama,” an indigenous concept of Mother Earth.
However, there was little response to the ITT proposal from the international community.
This was partially due to issues such as President Correa threatening to drill if the initiative fails.
This aroused questions on the legitimacy of the proposal, and questions regarding reimbursement
if Ecuador were to break the agreement (Kennemore and Weeks, 2011, p. 276). The political
instability of Ecuador in recent years, with the last three presidents before President Correa not
finishing their terms, also led donors to hesitate and question whether the proposal would be
5

upheld under a different administration. Oil activity in other parts of Yasuní National Park was
also a deterrent to donors as they reasoned that activity in Blocks 16 and 31 were causing
damage to the very Park they were trying to preserve. Lastly, and most publicly, the forced
resignation of the Foreign Minister Fander Faconí whom Rafael Correa accused of
‘environmental infantilism’ for allowing foreign governments to add conditions to their
donations could be contributed to its failure. All of these issues did not help Ecuador gain the
trust they needed to be successful in this agreement. When in August 2013 actual contributions
rested at $13.3 million, Correa declared “The world has failed us…” (Greco-Stoner, 2013). After
this declared failure of the ITT proposal, the National Assembly, dominated by the Alianza Pais
party (the party of Rafael Correa) in October 2013 agreed to drill in the Ishpingo-TambocochaTiputini block (Alvaro, 2014).
The decision to allow the state national oil company (Petroamazonas) to drill in this block
has been controversial not only for environmental reasons, but because the intangible zone
intersects the southern part of the ITT block, near oil field Ishpingo-S (see Fig. 4 and Fig. 5).
Petroamazonas “plans to drill 360 wells, half of them in Ishpingo, which it estimates holds some
50% of the ITT block’s reserves” (Alvaro, 2014). However, the National Assembly did declare
that oil development would not occur in the “portion of the Ishpingo field that is within the
ZITT” (Alvaro, 2014). Despite these precautions, environmentalists and human right activists
argue that it will still have irreversible effects on these communities because of its proximity to
the Tagaeri and Taromenane territory.
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Fig. 4 This map demonstrates that the ITT Block (furthest right) contains a part of the ZITT
Intangible Zone in its boundaries. The PVIs Territory represents both the Intangible Zone and the
Buffer Zone (Pappalardo, S. E., De Marchi, M., & Ferrarese, F., 2013)

Fig. 5 This map shows the three oil fields within the ITT block: Ishpingo, Tambococha, Tiputini.
A southern part of the Ishpingo field lies within the ZITT. (FWN select, 2004).
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It is also controversial because it contradicts the constitution created by the Correa
administration. This 2008 Constitution provides a legal framework to protect these indigenous
groups from oil extractive policies. The Constitution states “The territories of the peoples living
in voluntary isolation are an irreducible and intangible ancestral possession and all forms of
extractive activities shall be forbidden there. The State shall adopt measures to guarantee their
lives, enforce respect for self-determination and the will to remain in isolation and to ensure
observance of their rights. The violation of these rights shall constitute a crime of ethnocide,
which shall be classified as such by law” (2008 Ecuador Constitution). Despite this framework,
drafted by President Correa himself, he has decided to move forward and drill in the ITT block
of Yasuní National Park. This commitment to drill near the ZITT, though not in direct violation
of the constitution, threatens to harm the very groups it had once set out to protect.
This controversial decision to drill for hydrocarbons in Yasuní National Park near the
intangible zone, after the failure of the ITT proposal, triggers many questions about President
Rafael Correa’s leftist government. What is new about twenty-first century socialism’s approach
to hydrocarbons and its insertion into the global market? Though twenty-first century socialism
has had a change in social policies, how has that been reflected in its economic model, especially
regarding oil development? How does the Yasuní case study reflect the contradictions of twentyfirst century socialism?
Argument
Using the Yasuní-ITT case, I will explore and challenge the development strategies of
Rafael Correa in Ecuador and, more generally, the new Latin American left. Claiming to
implement a post-neoliberal development model that stands to uphold the principles of buen
vivir, post-neoliberalism, and the 2008 constitution, the Yasuní-ITT case seems less like a
8

commitment to the rights of the Pachamama and the rights of indigenous tribes, and more like a
political tactic, the creation of a hollow narrative that positions the new Latin American left as
anti-Northern, anti- IMF, and as “post-neoliberal,” regardless of outcome (Davidov, 2012, p. 12).
Correa’s actions in the aftermath of the ITT proposal, as well as other leftist leaders such as
Morales in Bolivia and Chavez in Venezuela, demonstrate the movement’s acceptance of
hydrocarbon extractivism and current development models. The Yasuní-ITT case study
demonstrates that the “post-neoliberal development strategies” seen in Ecuador do not reflect
truly the ideas of twenty-first century socialism, but rather it is solely a narrative of sovereignty
in a hyper Northern neoliberal world. The new left still has yet to change their economic model
and hydrocarbon development to fit the values of “buen vivir” and their narrative of antiimperialism.
Methodology
In this thesis, I examine different data from the World Bank, US Energy Information
Administration (EIA), IndexMundi, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC), the Ecuadorean government, and other sources, in order to determine the
changes under the Correa administration in oil and development strategies. I also use experts,
and their research to drive my argument and further explore twenty-first century socialism. These
sources and data will help prove that the Correa administration, and other Latin American leftist
governments, are not providing a viable “post-neoliberal development strategy,” but rather that
the systems we see in place are a form of neo-extractivism, a system that continues to exploit
hydrocarbons but with a larger state role. By examining the historical trends and current trends
in oil and development I hope to prove the contradictions in the twenty-first century socialist
narrative. However, due to the Correa administration’s recent rise to power and current reign,
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some data may not exist for the most recent years, which could perhaps provide some limitations
to my analysis.
In the following chapters I will begin by defining and exploring keywords that are
instrumental in the analyses of my hypothesis. Key terms such as twenty-first century socialism,
post-neoliberalism, buen vivir, and neo-extractivism will be defined in order to make
comparisons between administrations. Chapter 3 will discuss the historical trends surrounding oil
exploitation and indigenous groups in Ecuador in order to understand historical development
strategies in Ecuador, and how they “differ” from current strategies. This chapter will also
demonstrate the historical implications of oil on local communities. The following chapter,
Chapter 4 will attempt to define Correa’s plan for Ecuador’s twenty-first century socialism
development strategies. It will review initial policies and “goals” of the administration that
attempt to uphold the values of buen vivir and post-neoliberalism. However, in practice, do these
current strategies truly differ from the destructive policies of the past? Does reality match the
narrative? Chapter 5 will use quantitative data to demonstrate the discrepancies between Correa’s
narrative and his actual policies. It will demonstrate the contradictions of the twenty-first century
socialist narrative with the reality of extractive policies. Chapter 6 will then analyze these
contradictions and conclude that instead of a post-neoliberal alternative, twenty-first century
socialism relies on a neo-extractivist model that falls short of its promised values. It will also
question Ecuador’s ability to even challenge historical development models. In order to make
these conclusions, I will, in the next chapter, define how I will be using key terms in order to
make comparisons between administrations and models.
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Chapter 2
Conceptual framework

In order to fully answer the questions and explore the arguments laid out in the
Introduction chapter, I will define and give a framework for a few key concepts in this chapter
before diving into the critiques and real life implications of these terms in Yasuní, Ecuador. The
four terms defined in this chapter are the i) New Latin American Left/ Twenty-first century
socialism (which I will use interchangeably), ii)Buen Vivir/ Sumak Kawsay, iii) Neoextractivism, and iv) Post-neoliberalism. The purpose of this chapter is to understand the current
leftist political trend in Latin America, and specifically the movement in Ecuador. This will help
us to explore the New Left and its current development strategies.
Twenty-first century socialism
The New Latin American Left came as a backlash to the heavy presence of the neoliberal
right in the 80s and 90s. The decade of the 2000s started a new era for Latin America, an era of
the Left, as the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela arose. The Bolivarian Revolution
transformed into the more universal Twenty-first century socialism with the leftist turn in
Ecuador, Bolivia, and to some extent, Brazil and Argentina (Fontaine, 2011, p. 2888). Though
this political movement has been alive for at least a decade, it is still struggling to define itself.
Described as a process of transformation, it improves upon 20 century socialism in order to
th

better reject neoliberal capitalism that has plagued developing nations. The three countries I use
to define twenty-first century socialism are Ecuador, Venezuela, and Bolivia due to their
11

similarities in the rise to power and their development models. Dwinell et. al. describe the
process of twenty- first century socialism transformation as one that “typically includes the rise
of new leaders, the proclamation of new economic policies, and some recovery of the role of the
state. Its political leaders proclaim their commitment to promoting equality and transforming the
exercise of power….” (Dwinell, et. al. 2013, p. 2). Twenty-first century socialism, as a general
trend across Latin America, positions itself as a political movement as a) post-neoliberal, as b)
capitalist, as c) democratic, and as d) a champion of human rights.
Post-neoliberalism is an instrumental part of the creation of twenty-first century socialism
and its development strategy. Post-neoliberalism is a rejection of traditional neoliberal ideas and
policies that plagued Latin America from the 80s on. It rejects the notions of the Washington
Consensus that promote trade liberalization, deregulation, and privatization. Latin American
post-neoliberal strategies, in order to move away from the historic “Northern” ties of neoliberal
economic policy, offer an alternative to dogmatic neoliberalism. The term Northern in this thesis
will refer to the United States and European nations who have traditionally on the global scale
held power and influence over historically colonized nation. In this manner, post-neoliberalism
attempts to lessen its dependency on such nations and their institutions (i.e. IMF, World Bank,
etc.) Further, post-neoliberalism attempts to achieve a system that accounts for the social,
economic and political failings of neoliberalism, but without completely breaking away from
world systems (Harnecker, 2010, p. 37). With this goal, post-neoliberal thinkers have created a
development strategy and policy framework that create new paths toward globalization and
challenge corporate transnational powers (Leiva, 2008, p. xi). Through the inclusion of
democracy, a greater and dynamic state role, and committed officials who are responsible to their
citizens, post-neoliberalism attempts to focus on not only national economic growth, but the
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social sphere as well (Harnecker, 2010, p. 37) (Riggirozzi, 2010, p. 71). As the Wall Street
Journal concluded, it is a “‘new breed of pragmatic leftists’ dedicated to combining the ‘left’s
traditional warm-hearted goals with a newfound appreciation for cold economic calculus’”
(Leiva, 2008, p. xvii).
Post-neoliberalism is not so much a clear checklist of policies, but a broad movement to
reject neoliberal principles. Post-neoliberalism as a development strategy moves toward a
diversified sustainable economy that is independent from Northern, traditionally imperial
powers. The Ecuadorean Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo (National Secretary
of Planning and Development) listed multiple goals to work towards in order to transition to a
sustainable post-neoliberal economy in a document called Buen Vivir Plan Nacional 2013-2017.
The three important values and strategies listed in this document are “Strengthen the state's role
as a catalyst for the production and market regulator,” “Investing public resources to generate
sustained economic growth and structural changes,” and “Maintaining sustainability of economic
flows” (Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo, 2013, p. 79-83). Through these three
goals of increasing the state role in economic sectors, using funds to invest in the public sector,
and by creating sustainable sources of income, the Ecuadorean government will attempt to
transition to a model that implements a human and sustainable aspect to economic strategies.
In this manner, twenty-first century socialism is not a full rejection of capitalism, but an
attempt to create alternative strategies within capitalism that are inherently post-neoliberal. It
differs from Marxism-Leninism in that it embraces parts of capitalism, but rejects neoliberal
market policies developed by foreign, and “Northern” nations. It seeks to “incorporate capitalism
within a humanitarian rubric” (Kennemore and Weeks, 2011, p. 268). The market still exists, but
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it can, and is supposed to be, challenged with new alternatives developed (Kennemore and
Weeks, 2011, p. 268).
Twenty-first century socialism is also not a rejection of democracy. Rather, through a
democratic manner, it seeks to increase the role of the state in the economy and in social
programs in order to distribute resources more efficiently (Kennemore and Weeks, 2011, p. 268).
Elections and voting processes are an important part of the process. Harnecker expands that the
new left understands that “the struggle for democracy cannot be separated from the struggle for
socialism because it is only under socialism that democracy can develop fully” (Harnecker,
2010, p. 5).
It is lastly a rejection of the worker-centered approach of Marxism and instead attempts
to take on the defense of all discriminated social sectors: women, indigenous peoples, black
people, young people, children, people of all sexual orientations, people with disabilities, and
others (Harnecker, 2010). Twenty-first century socialism, according to Ecuadorean President
Rafael Correa, will not only push for gender and ethnic equality for its citizens, but also defend
the life of the living environment (Burbach, Fox, and Fuentes, 2013, p.39). The “inclusion” of
the environment, indigenous groups, and Afro-Ecuadoreans in the 2008 Ecuadorean constitution
demonstrates this commitment to traditionally marginalized groups.
A Comparison
The “restructured governments” of Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela reflect all of these
values of twenty-first century socialism through similar policies and trends in which they
developed this new political model. The consistency and similarities between these three
countries make twenty-first century socialism an established political model and international
movement, instead of an isolated politician. This is an important consideration in this paper, for
14

though I mostly focus on Correa in Ecuador, twenty-first century socialism is a regional trend
where all three of these countries are attempting to redefine their hydrocarbon development
strategies. By quickly comparing these three nations and their goals and commitment to these
values, we can have a better understanding of twenty-first century socialism as a movement.
Briefly, I will explore these nations commitment to both democracy and human rights, and their
post-neoliberal capitalist strategies.
The creation of new legal framework, such as the development of new constitutions in all
three states, demonstrate the values of democracy and human rights in twenty-first century
models. All three constitutions, developed and instituted by the faces of twenty-first century
socialism, Chávez, Correa and Morales, included important human rights articles in order to
protect indigenous groups. This inclusion is momentous in that these three nation have a history
of oppression and exclusion of indigenous groups. This commitment to the collective rights of
such groups is a huge symbol of the twenty-first century model embracing human rights, even
for traditionally marginalized groups. These constitutions were all instituted by referendum early
in the presidencies of these twenty-first century socialist leaders in order to include the people
and assert democracy into the framing of these movements. Beyond the constitutions, “the
frequency of electoral contests, including party primaries, recall elections, and national
referendums, [and] high levels of voter turnout” demonstrate this commitment to democracy and
the people (Ellner, 2012, p. 98).
These three nations in the creation of the twenty-first century socialist model have also
highly increased the role of the state in order to create post-neoliberal development strategies that
nationalize and regulate production. Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, shortly after the rise of a
twenty-first century socialist leader, passed policies that forced renegotiated contracts with
15

hydrocarbon companies. Along with these policies, these governments, through a variety of
policies, attempted to strengthen their country's own extractive companies. These huge
nationalization policies shifted the dynamics in state-extractive relationships and allowed the
states to claim more profits from extractive companies. Beyond the state role in the economic
sector, all three leaders have worked to strengthen their own governments and government
control. They strengthened the executive branch, through political changes and media influence,
in order to reduce influence the elites and corporate influence (Ellner, 2012, p. 100). All of these
policies have strengthened these leaders, and their administrations to be powerful change makers.
They demonstrate the values of strong government, and post-neoliberalism through
nationalization.
The nationalization of hydrocarbon industries under twenty-first century socialism has
caused, in at least the cases of Venezuela and Ecuador, the state to use extra petroleum funds to
create social programs. This “petro-populism” has traditionally been used as a critique by
rightists against past administrations, and recently has been associated with twenty-first century
socialism. However, I will use the term simply to describe the processes of petroleum funds
funding government programs in an attempt to redistribute profit.
These four general values of twenty-first century socialism can be seen across Latin
America through these three states. However, each nation, due to different individual historical
and social trajectories have developed different forms of this system. Ecuador in its development
of this political model has relied heavily on the philosophy of buen vivir/sumak kawsay to define
their leftist movement and push towards post-neoliberalism.
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Buen Vivir
Buen vivir, or sumak kawsay in Kichwa, is the philosophy in which Ecuador has framed
its post-extractive stance, its constitution, and its new political framework. Translating into
Spanish as buen vivir and into English as “good living,” sumak kawsay means to live in harmony
with communities, oneself, and the living environment, the Pachamama. Ecuador is using this
philosophy to attempt to govern in a way that is “community-centric, ecologically-balanced and
culturally-sensitive” (Balch, 2013). Buen vivir is influenced not only by the Kichwa sumak
kawsay, but also owes much of its political philosophy to critiques of capitalism and
neoliberalism (Balch, 2013). Buen vivir also includes the concepts of ecological and cultural
responsible development, and collectivism, a theme that has always been tied to the Latin
American left. This philosophy is what spurs the Latin American left to create, supposedly, a
post-neoliberal development strategy that values the local, the environment, and humans over
capital. In the Buen Vivir Plan Nacional 2013-2017, it states the three problems buen vivir will
address (1) inequality, both internationally and within the nation, (2) conflict between
development and social issues, and (3) the lack of sustainability in economic growth (Secretaría
Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo, 2013, p. 21-31). In order to address these problems the
Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo state that buen vivir should strive toward a
society that is egalitarian, that is democratic and plurinational and in harmony with nature. Buen
vivir works with a post-neoliberal development strategy to include the social and human
component in economic development.
However, despite the values we have seen promoted by President Correa and by other
leftist leaders, many argue, because of case studies such as Yasuní-ITT, that twenty-first century
socialism is not fulfilling its promises of buen vivir and its commitment to post-neoliberal
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strategies. Instead of developing a new development strategy, it has instead simply settled for a
new form of extractivism: neo-extractivism.
Neo-Extractivism
The extractive model, an “old world system,” is the foundation of capitalism. It is a
system that developed with colonialism, as colonial states such as those from Latin America,
extracted and exported resources while others, typically Northern, manufactured. The
discrepancy between which nations produced primary resources and those that developed
industry lies at the heart of those that are “developed” v. “developing.” This unbalanced system
is the basis of the resource curse theory, where countries rich with resources have more difficulty
developing as they tend to have primary economies. Though resources, especially hydrocarbons,
can accumulate wealth, this not necessarily transform nations into long-term developed nations
(Valdivia and Benadvides, 2012, p. 72). For most “resource cursed” nations, especially petrostates, Karl in the Paradox of Plenty argues that the primary model of extraction leads to high
capital intensity and dependency on a single, depletable source (Karl, 1997, p. 48-49). These
two fundamental realities of the primary extractivist economy are the key to understanding the
slow development of resource rich nations as it creates an economy prone to severe cycles of
prosperity and debt, large foreign investors and low waged employment (Karl, 1997, p. 48).
These three externalities begin to explain the slow development of resource rich nations. Further,
scholars such as Lane and Tornell argue that because of these components in the primary
resource economy, its shapes the political economy of the nation to engage in certain behaviors
such as extreme rent-seeking (Lane &Tornell, 1996, p. 239). These behaviors create an instable
political economy furthering the difficulty of transitioning to a sustainable diversified economy.
Therefore, the traditional development model of extraction in many ex-colonial states supports
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this resource curse theory as it severely relies on a primary economy that can create these
conditions. The extractive model is then fundamentally structured on these notions of a primary
agro-extractive model and heavy extractive policies in an attempt to continuously create wealth,
despite price fluctuations.
Neo-extractivism differs from traditional extractivism through the involvement of the
state. The state attempts to capture more profit from extractive activities through nationalization
policies that encourage state companies, rather than foreign investors. It also attempts to be more
transparent in order to reduce corruption and prevent extractive wealth from leaving the country
through foreign investment. Instead neo-extractivism attempts to reverse this trend and
redistribute funds through the state. Governments use the profits from these resources to
implement important social programs, creating new sources of social legitimacy (Burbach, et. al.,
2013, p. 42). This ensures that extractives, instead of solely benefitting the domestic elites and
developed nations, are now essential to combatting poverty and promoting development.
However it continues to reflect “historical” extractivism as it continues the role of the primary
agro-extractive model that is still prone to the fluctuations of the market and the dictations of
Northern nations and institutions. This unstable primary economy prohibits it from truly being
post-neoliberal, though it does shift away from privatization policies and attempts to account for
the worst symptoms of neoliberalism and the resource curse.
These terms and their context will allow us to explore further the twenty-first century
socialism regime in Ecuador and examine what has changed within its development strategy. Has
President Correa developed a viable post-neoliberal strategy, or, has he simply engaged in neoextractive policies? Concepts such as buen vivir and post-neoliberalism are important values to
the twenty-first century socialist model. Are these values truly reflected in Correa’s development
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strategy, or are they simply a constructed narrative? The next chapter will discuss the historical
implications of past oil development strategies before Chapter 4 begins to discuss and examine
current development strategies and how they fit with the buen vivir, post-neoliberal narrative.
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Chapter 3
Historical Background on Oil Development

In order to engage in conversations on current twenty-first century socialist oil
development strategies, we need to understand firstly the historical implications of oil in Ecuador
and how political economic models affect its development, and secondly, the complicated
relationship between this fossil fuel, the state and its citizens. Understanding these broad
historical trends is imperative to understanding the current political movement and development
strategies. Oil, ever since it was discovered on the Oriente in 1967, has had a significant role in
the economy, a condition that has allowed it to become so controversial; whether it is a source of
national pride or a harmful practice damaging the lives of those who surround it. This tricky
relationship with oil, its ownership, it exploitation, and its economic importance still drives the
attitudes and contradictions of oil that we see today. In this chapter I will explore historical oil
development strategies from the 1970s on. These historical strategies are important in examining
current strategies, and whether or not these current strategies reflect twenty-first century socialist
values, or rather that they reflect “historical” development models. I will also explore historical
conflicts between oil, the environment and indigenous group and the irreparable damage that has
been made to these communities because of flaws in past development strategies. These conflicts
and their implications today are imperative in understanding the backlash and fear to extractivist
policies.
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Development of Oil
The history of oil in Ecuador, or the history of any commodity in Latin America, can only
be understood in its current context by its depth and entanglement in the story of its nation. In the
late 1800s, before the booming rubber trade, The Amazon was considered before nothing more
than “tierras baldías,” or empty lands. The discovery of resources, such as rubber, and the 1941
Peruvian War positioned the Amazon Rainforest to be a symbol of national pride and an
abundance of profitable resources (Rival, 2012, p. 4). Ecuador’s loss in the Peruvian War
resulted in the loss of Amazon territory, creating a sense of pride in what Amazon territory
remained: the resources (oil) and land it could offer Ecuador. Years later, oil companies searched
for hydrocarbons to confirm these valuable resources. Finally with Texaco’s discovery of oil
(later Chevron) in 1967, it became even more a symbol of national pride. By 1970, only three
years later, 10 million hectares were granted to petroleum companies in order to attract
investment in hydrocarbons and oil production in the Amazon rainforest (Perreault and Valdivia,
2010, p. 692).
This discovery of oil was only the beginning in its framing of development strategies.
Since then it has become a mainstay of the Ecuadorean economy. Because of oil’s imperative
role in the economy, and Ecuador’s dependency on it, oil has shaped Ecuador’s governance,
trade policies, and development strategies. To illustrate this, in the early 70s, oil perhaps
represented between 1% and 3% of GDP, however by 2008 it had reached 21.6% (Kozameh and
Ray, 2012, p. 10). Oil has been ingrained into this country’s sense of governance and sense of
economy. Through large petroleum reserves and flexible governing policies on oil and
hydrocarbon corporations Ecuador has been solidified as a petro-state (Valdivia, 2008, p. 461).
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The 1970s oil boom, mostly due to high international oil prices, helped transform
Ecuador into a country with a strong economy, a growth of government, and an expanding
health, education, and housing program. However, it also became a country with a mounting
foreign debt. Petroleum in Ecuador is the epitome of the resource curse that has plagued
developing countries since colonialism. Though petroleum serves as an invaluable economic
resource that brings capital to the nation, it also links it to a system that heavily depends on the
market, systems of capitalism, and foreign investors that for a variety of reasons creates
dependency and stunt in economic growth. Loans and investments from “developed” nations in
the 70s led to the Latin American “lost decade” of the 80s when countries were unable to pay
back debts. The petro-resource curse is the Paradox of Plenty for though “massive petroleum
rents are accrued by states over decades, these gains do not translate into long-term national
well-being.” (Valdivia and Benadvides, 2012, p. 72) (Karl, 1997). Rather, it creates a
disillusionment with modernity, a false promise that because of the flow of capital, it will lead to
economic success and the decline of poverty. However, as we have seen in many of the excolonial states that rely primarily on an agro-extractive primary economy, with either agricultural
products or mineral/hydrocarbon commodities, there are severe cycles of prosperity and decline.
It also results in external indebtedness because of the dependency on market prices, foreign
investors, and neoliberal world systems. Ecuador, because of its dependency on oil for more than
40 years, has had an unreliable economy that has, arguably, led to unstable governments and low
overall growth rates. To demonstrate this, the last three popularly elected Presidents had not
finished their terms. The last 15 years, before Correa’s election, contained nine presidents, and
there have been large struggles between the branches of government, causing struggles in
accomplishing policies. This politically unstable history is what has allowed the New Left and
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Correa to emerge as a powerful force of “change.” The resource curse presents only one of the
contradictions and complication of oil in Ecuador for though oil is a mainstay of the economy, it
has not brought the modernity, prosperity and national pride that Ecuadoreans have hoped for.
Oil development strategies have changed across Latin America from the 70s on in an
effort to more “efficiently” extract and spur development. Throughout most of the 1950s-1970s,
a popular economic model called Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) was being
experimented with across Latin America. ISI promoted nationalization and protected infant
industries through tariffs and subsidies in an effort to grow their industrial base and further
develop their state. This theory was reflected in initial oil policies in the 70s. For example, the
Law of Hydrocarbons, passed in Ecuador in 1973, gave the State the right to manage petroleum
as a public resource; a resource that would finance development programs for Ecuadorean
citizens (Valdivia, 2008, p. 459). Around this same time, in 1972 the Corporación Estatal
Petrolera Ecuatoriana (CEPE) (now PetroEcuador) a national oil company was established. This
creation of a national oil company was a step towards the nationalization of oil companies with
greater state control, and rents accruing to the Ecuadorean state. Valdivia writes, “In this context,
CEPE became the most important public institution, as it managed the distribution and
investment of petroleum revenues” (Valdivia, 2008, p. 462). However, at the end of the 1970s
with many Latin American nations having accrued high debt to “Northern” nations, along with
dropping oil prices, it ushered in the next political economic model, neoliberalism.
Neoliberalism, the economic model that Correa is attempting to change, was adopted by Latin
American nations in the 1980s due to the insistence of the IMF and World Bank through
structural adjustment programs and conditional loans. Neoliberalism promotes private industry,
the liberalization of trade and global markets. The 80s completely reversed oil policies in
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Ecuador and allowed for the ‘opening’ of the national petroleum industry to foreign investors,
increased petroleum development (in order to increase revenue), and the restructuring and
division of the CEPE. This restructuring divided the CEPE into affiliated but independent
enterprises that would tackle distinct aspects of petroleum production (e.g., exploration,
production of derivatives, domestic distribution) and was proposed as a mechanism to increase
efficiency. However, it simply just decreased state control. These “neoliberal rationalities” have
governed petroleum since the 1980s (Valdivia, 2008, p.463).
The framing of oil primarily as a resource of national pride hints at the issues of
sovereignty that surrounds it. After the financial crisis in the 80s where “Northern” institutions
began to govern and construct Ecuador’s oil strategies, oil became the means in which the county
was subject to “imperial powers.” With much of oil capital leaving the country to go to foreign
investors or the wealthiest of Ecuador, Rafael Correa was an appealing politician that presented
himself as anti-neoliberal. He promised to re-nationalize oil and capture more profits which
could be used for the development of the state. This “new” economic model is a backlash against
the dogmatic neoliberal policies that encompass most of Ecuador’s oil history and the reclaiming
of oil as a resource. However it is important to recognize and question the “newness” of the
current model emerging. Is it truly a new system working towards post-neoliberalism, or is it
simply a return to the ISI policies of the 70s? More importantly how does the issue of oil as a
symbol of sovereignty conflict with the image of oil as a human right violator?
Conflict with oil
Since the discovery of oil in the Amazon, there has been severe conflict over the “oil
frontier” as it continues to expand into indigenous territory (Rival, 2012, p. 1). Beyond the
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changes in economic models and the plague of the resource curse, the conflict of oil lies between
the preservation of the rainforest, the protection of indigenous groups and the extraction of a
national resource. These three interests are at the core of Ecuador’s relationship with oil.
Ecuador’s petroleum economy has created political tensions and “engendered powerful
mobilizations against social injustices associated with petroleum extraction, production, and
profit generation, such as land appropriation, detrimental health effects, loss of traditional
knowledge, and the marginalization of indigenous peoples” (Perreault and Valdivia, 2010, p.
692). The clearest example of this conflict between oil and indigenous groups is the infamous
Chevron court case in which indigenous groups sued Chevron for the health and environmental
damages as a result of oil extraction.
The oil pollution in Ecuador with the Chevron case “has been characterized as ‘one of the
largest environmental disasters in history’ by Rainforest Action Network” and a major public
health crisis (Greco-Stoner, 2013). Texaco, which merged with Chevron in 2001, operated in
Ecuador for about 30 years with an extractivist policy that prioritized cost over environmental
clean-up. They participated in practices such as dumping “produced water” (wastewater) into
streams, the construction of unlined toxic waste pits and the burning of fuels. However, Chevron
argues that these practices were unregulated by Ecuador. If true, this further contributes to the
dirty legacy of oil in this nation; an often unregulated exploitative practice that has been
associated with neoliberal strategies.
The contamination of water and soil used by people for essential activities such
agriculture, fishing, bathing and drinking has resulted “in an epidemic of cancer,
miscarriages, birth defects, and other ailments” (Chevron-Toxico, 2014). Beyond these deadly
health problems, far more people suffer from frequent illness of a more minor type such as
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skin rashes and diarrhea. It has prevented indigenous groups from practicing their livelihoods
through fishing and hunting. Because of its large effect on mainly indigenous groups, oil can
be seen as a discriminatory violation of human rights. The Chevron-Toxico movement states
that “In this way, oil contamination has become a constant, oppressive, inescapable fact of life
for thousands of residents of the Oriente.” (Chevron-Toxico, 2014).
Oil in Ecuador is therefore not only a source of dependency and a mainstay of economic
development, but also a source of conflict, of violence, and of human right violations. Oil has
a dirty history that goes way further than one case study. Oil has prohibited indigenous groups
in the Amazon to practice their culture, their livelihoods, and protect their health. It has
destroyed acres of biodiverse lands and has led to multiple spills across the nation. Oil is
beyond simply just a resource curse plaguing a developed nation, it is a source of conflict, of
oppressiveness, and of environmental destruction.
The framing of oil as a destructive resource that has infringed upon indigenous rights
is another important history of oil development that needs to be understood. The activists
involved in the current conflict in Yasuní come from this perspective that oil, regardless of
“safety measures” will harm the environment and indigenous groups in a manner that exploits
them both. This context is in direct conflict to the framing of oil as a natural resource and tool
to assert sovereignty. How can a government rectify these two opposing views of oil? Can this
be done under a post-neoliberal development strategy?
Conclusion
Oil is a complex and conflictual resource in Ecuador as it represents two “evils” to the
nation. The first evil is that Ecuadorean oil and resources has been exploited by imperial
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powers and been used to take away Ecuador’s autonomy over its resources. In the second, oil
extraction is a destructive and exploitative practice that infringes on the rights of indigenous
groups and damages the earth. In order to resolve these oil strategy issues there are two paths.
In the understanding of oil as a means of sovereignty, development strategies could change
from a neoliberal structure dependent on foreign investors to a nationalized resource. It would
mean the reclamation of oil as “Ecuadorean” and “of the people.” However, in order to
change the destructive legacy of oil to indigenous groups, current development strategies
would have to completely denounce the exploitation of oil. These two opposing views on how
to deal with the “oil issue” has led to the conflict over Yasuní ITT. Past oil development
strategies, and their effects, are important to both understanding the rise of twenty-first
century socialism and the contradictory laws and strategies seen under Rafael Correa’s model.
Though claiming to attempt new oil development strategies that could perhaps
reconcile both of these images of oil, current development strategies seem hauntingly similar
to historical development models. While some critics argue that these “post-neoliberal”
strategies reflect a continuation of neoliberal extractive policy with heavy production and
large foreign investment, others argue that it is a revival of the “failed” I.S.I. strategies of the
70s. Regardless, Correa’s new oil development strategy is a central part of his twenty-first
century socialist model, and his attempt to uphold the values of the leftist movement.
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Chapter 4
Correa and Oil Policies: Petro-populism

The election of President Rafael Correa in 2006 marked the beginning of a drastic change
in Ecuadorean politics. He represented the New Left and change from the economic and oil
policies that plagued Ecuador. He now represents stability since he has been in office for nine
years, a great feat for a country like Ecuador which in the 15 years before Correa, had nine
presidents. Correa’s emergence from this instability and the dogmatic neoliberalism of the 90s
has allowed him to achieve his “citizen’s revolution.” His promise of change and twenty-first
century socialism resonated with a people subject to the policies of “Northern Institutions” for
years. In July of 2008 with the approval of the Constitution, Correa declared, “Today Ecuador
has decided on a new nation. The old structures are defeated. This confirms the citizens’
revolution” (Becker, 2011, p. 47). This new Ecuador ensured all the promises of twenty-first
century socialism: a commitment to post-neoliberal strategies, a changing positive relationship
with its indigenous peoples, and a tackling of extreme poverty in the nation.
The election of Rafael Correa in 2006 fit the trend of the regime change to “twenty-first
century socialism” that seemed to be sweeping across South America. Rafael Correa promised
change, by creating a government and a constitution that passed in 2008, that upheld the values
of “buen vivir.” This new political model protected the rights of the people, of indigenous
groups, and of the “Pachamama.” It looked to create a development strategy that still protected
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the rights of its people and that strengthened the state in regulating industry. In order to create
this socialist vision, oil policy had to be de- and reconstructed from its past form. To change the
cruel and exploitative legacy of oil in Ecuador, the New Left and Rafael Correa needed to “reimagine hydrocarbon governance” in a way that fit with the ideals of twenty-first century
socialism. His policies have attempted to embrace the “humaneness of socialism while pursuing
the efficiency of capitalism” (Becker, 2013, p. 48). Through his policies of nationalization and
social welfare programs, Correa has attempted to face the economic challenge of all resource
curse nations: “how to shift the country from its long-standing extractive economy, which
benefits national oligarchies and northern elites, to sustainable and equitable development”
(Benjamin, 2010). Correa’s petro-populism attempts to fight traditional exploitative oil strategies
and to “redefine the rules of the game underpinning the political system” (Riggiorozzi, 2010,
p.73).
Oil Policy
Oil policy under Correa and twenty-first century socialism has been re-imagined through
both the legal framework via the 2008 constitution and through ownership via the nationalization
of oil (Perreault and Valdivia, 2010, p. 691). The constitution created several articles in order to
protect people and the environment from harmful extractive policies, and to ensure the
nationalization of hydrocarbons. Articles 71 and 72 of the constitution protect the rights of
nature, the Pachamama. It states the right to maintaining its integrity and reserves the right to
restoration in the case of the obstruction of nature cycles, including the harvesting of fossil fuels
(2008 Ecuador Constitution). This protection and investment in the environment shows a
commitment to sustainable development and the Pachamama as a priority. As mentioned in
Chapter 1, Article 57 of the constitution guarantees the rights of indigenous groups and protects
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those groups’ rights to ancestral territory. For voluntarily isolated groups, it forbids the practice
of extractivism. Protecting local populations, especially indigenous populations that have
disproportionately felt the weight of oil policies, is an important step in changing economic
policy. Lastly, the constitution encourages a greater role for the state in hydrocarbon
development, Article 313 of the constitution states that “the State reserves the right to administer,
regulate, monitor and manage strategic sectors, following the principles of environmental
sustainability, precaution, prevention and efficiency” (2008 Ecuador Constitution).
Along with the foundation of the constitution that promotes sustainability, human rights
and nationalization to be included in development policies, new policies have also come into
being that shift oil revenue and protect national interest. In much the same way that Venezuela
and Bolivia nationalized hydrocarbon companies, though perhaps less complete, this reform
began with a policy that stated “multinational companies had to reverse 50% of their
‘extraordinary incomes’ to the State” (Fontaine, 2011, p. 2982). In 2007, President Correa
increased this participation by 99%. He also offered the possibility of renegotiating their contract
in which the share of these extraordinary incomes would then only redirect 70% of the profits to
the state (Fontaine, 2011, p. 2982). Through these policies of nationalization in hydrocarbons
Correa has been able to “redirect larger portions of the surpluses directly to the state” to create an
“alternative system of welfare intervention and redistribution….an explicitly revolutionary
model – yet not anti-capitalist” (Kennemore and Weeks, 2011, p. 268) (Riggiorozzi, 2010, p.73).
Through the governing of energy policy with strong state control, Correa framed the initiative as
socially responsible. His policies gave him the power to protect the environment and workers’
rights, and reverse the outflow of oil funds to state welfare.
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By creating a system that attempts to eliminate the worst excesses of extraction (legal
framework) while reclaiming oil as a tool for achieving sovereignty (nationalization), President
Correa attempts to implement a system that fits his post-neoliberal and buen vivir values. As
discussed in the previous chapter, oil can represent both a means to assert sovereignty and a
destructive violator of human rights. Through these frameworks, President Correa endeavors to
reconcile both of these symbols of oil.
Social Programs
In January 2012, “Ecuador’s president Rafael Correa completed five years in office with
the highest approval ratings of any leader in Latin America…” (Becker, 2013, p. 43). In his first
months in office, Correa had delivered on his campaign promises by doubling poverty assistance
payments and credits available for housing loans, subsidizing electricity rates for low-income
consumers, and re-channeling millions of dollars into social programs (Kennemore and Weeks,
2011, p. 270). Correa has been able to accomplish these policies that shift resources to poor and
marginalized sectors of society, and his popularity, by funding from the state’s extractivist
policies (Becker, 2013, p. 49). Petroleum revenues have funded state-led programs that address
urbanization, health, and education. One such policy, the Bono de la Vivienda program (Housing
Grant Program), works to expand access to housing finance through a combination of grants and
loans that target low-income and senior citizen groups (Ray and Kozameh, 2012, p. 15).The
program provides financial assistance to Ecuadorean families to either buy, build (upon family
owned land) or improve upon a home (LLerena Pinto et. al., 2015, p. 6). As a result, total
housing credit in Ecuador grew by nearly 50 percent in 2009, and this program now accounts for
over half of all housing credit. (Ray and Kozameh, 2012, p. 12). Another important policy to the
Correa administration in tackling social welfare issues has been the Bono de Desarrollo Humano
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(Human Development Grant). This program provides a guaranteed income security (conditional
cash transfers) to populations that are not covered by social security (LLerena Pinto et. al., 2015,
p. 5). Beneficiaries of this program, which consists of a $35 monthly cash transfer, are lowincome mothers and seniors who are not on pensions. They are considered conditional cash
transfers because in order to participate in the program, “mothers are required to take their
children under five years of age to health center medical checkups twice a year and enroll them
in school if they are between the ages of 5 and 17”(LLerena Pinto et. al., 2015, p. 5). In pursuing
these policies, Correa once again could be seen as following the strategies that Chávez pioneered
in Venezuela, and Morales adopted in Bolivia. In what conservative commentators have
derisively termed “petro populism,” all these governments have sought to use hydrocarbon rents
to fund social programs and encourage endogenous development (Becker, 2013, p. 49).
Education programs have also been a major focus of the Correa administration’s social
programs. Since 2007, around $280 million have gone to repairing and building schools (The
Economist, 2009). Beyond buildings, the Correa administration has been working to improve
quality from elementary schools to universities through a variety of measures and programs. The
Business Year lists these programs as “the reorganization of the supply of education
opportunities, through the concentration of all pre-tertiary academic levels in “hubs";
improvements in infrastructure and equipment; the implementation of a national system of
evaluation that includes student, teacher, and institutional performance assessments; and the
development of a new system of professional teacher development” (Business Year, 2015). This
long-term sustainable investment in human capital have been central strategies to fulfilling the
goals of buen vivir and achieving economic development.
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This investment in social programs has been an exciting part of the twenty-first century
socialist model. The fact that new oil development strategies include redistribution and the
amelioration of poverty into their goals is a huge improvement to past oil policies that had
historically seen most of oil funds in the hands of foreign companies or Ecuadorean elites. These
social strategies demonstrate a real commitment to the values of buen vivir and the bettering of
Ecuadorean lives.
Diversification Plan
Twenty-first century socialism has created a development plan that increases the role of
the State in all activities: in the extracting of resources, in the accruing of rent, in creating state
welfare programs and increasing access to capital. It also has a role in creating new economic
sectors and diversifying its industry. The diversification of industry is especially important for
developing nations plagued with the resource curse that are typically dependent on one resource,
and therefore subject to the unstable market. For Ecuador to truly fulfill its values of twenty-first
century socialism it needs to solve its dependency problem, reliant on the very system it wishes
to deconstruct. Despite precautions, continuing to rely on oil extractivism does not only harm
indigenous groups and the environment, but also creates a dependency on Northern nations,
produces a pattern of unequal accumulation, and lacks a highly specialized labor force. In order
to address these issues, the Correa administration established in the Plan Nacional Buen Vivir
2009-2013 (National Plan of Good Living) a development strategy to abandon the primary agroextractive export model (Freire, 2011, p. 8). Strategy 2 listed in the document on development
highlights the “Transformation of the Economy’s Model of Specialization through the Selective
Substitution of Imports” (Freire, 2011, p. 8). This strategy of the Correa administration states the
need to abandon primary extractivist policy of the past and shift to an economy with a variety of
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industries, with skilled laborers and that coexist with environmental needs. Through the use of
substitution, it can promote and protect these new growing industries. Strategy 3, “Increase of
Real Productivity and Diversification of Exports, Exporters and Markets” promotes the
deconcentrating of specific products toward specific areas. The need to delink from the
dependency of a primary extractive export model is important in increasing productivity and
making the economy less sensitive to the market. These two strategies highlight the importance
of diversification to twenty-first century socialism in creating sustainable development and
supporting an anti-imperial narrative
Diversification is a key strategy to achieving a post-neoliberal transition. By investing in
other industries, especially beyond oil and other primary products, Ecuador can begin to combat
the resource curse. This strategy is central to achieving the twenty-first century socialism
development plan. By lessening Ecuador’s dependency on foreign markets and by encouraging
their own products, Ecuador can move away from the primary agro-extractive economy that has
plagued it since colonialism.
Anti-imperial Policies
One of twenty-first century socialism’s most central value is anti-imperialism. This value
is about asserting sovereignty, overcoming imperial world systems and notions brought upon by
Northern nations and cutting the state’s dependency on Northern aid and loans. Diversification is
a huge step to delinking its dependency, asserting sovereignty and creating sustainable
development. Beyond this, Correa’s handling of debt demonstrates his commitment to moving
beyond traditional imperial powers of the North and the IMF. In 2008, President Correa
defaulted on Ecuador’s debt stating that it is “illegal, illegitimate, and corrupt” (Becker, 2013, p.
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47). This dismissal of a Northern Institution was an important symbol for Ecuador that it would
no longer be dependent on imperial institutions.
The other way this political model promotes anti-imperial notions is through the creation
of regional trade groups in an effort to move towards post-neoliberalism and take power away
from traditional Northern neoliberal trade groups. ALBA, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples
of Our America, is a Latin American trade group proposed as “as an alternative to the US-driven
Free Trade Area of the Americas” (Yaffe, 2011, p. 129) As President Rafael Correa states that
this regional trade group differs from others in that it emphasizes solidarity and not competition.
He states “The integration that we have sought [in previous decades] has been orientated towards
trade, to having larger markets and competing between us. In ALBA we don't talk about
competition, we speak of coordination in energy, finances and even in defense, but coordination,
not competition” (Yaffe, 2011, p. 132).
Anti-imperialism is an important part of the Ecuadorean twenty-first century socialist
model. Embracing policies and trade groups that further Ecuador from traditional imperial
powers such as the United States are important steps to asserting sovereignty and decreasing
Ecuador’s dependency. Through the “abandonment” of traditionally Northern institutions, such
as the IMF, by diversifying the economy and competing with Northern industry, and joining
regional trade groups that challenge traditional neoliberal strategies, President Correa is
attempting to create a post-neoliberal, anti-imperial development strategy.
Conclusion
Correa’s petro-populism seems evidence enough of a changing system, a model of postneoliberal development. A system that takes advantage of its resources, that rids oil companies of
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their excessive profit, and attempts to build its economy by decreasing poverty through social
programs, is a system that attempts to thwart the resource curse that has plagued Ecuador. These
policies position Ecuador to enter the global market through different means than those dictated
by the traditional Northern institutions.
Despite the changes Correa has made in the name of twenty-first century socialism, a
system of petro-populism, there are still questions on whether Correa has really triumphed over
the exploitative and inherently capitalistic nature of oil. Has Correa truly broken from traditional
notions of extractivism? This next chapter will explore data from the World Bank, the U.S.
Energy Information Administration, IndexMundi, and from the Ecuadorean government to
determine that has truly changed under Correa’s presidency? Has President Correa been able to
fulfill the promises of buen vivir and takes step toward a post-neoliberal paradigm?
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Chapter 5
Understanding the Realities of the Twenty-first Century Socialist Development Strategies

President Rafael Correa has carefully attempted to depict himself as a socialist committed
to transitioning to post-neoliberal development strategies. He has done this through the 2008
constitution, his alignment with twenty-first century socialism, and his social programs, while
also attempting to place himself as a champion of indigenous rights, and as fundamentally antiimperialist. The previous chapter depicts this framing and creation of Ecuador’s version of
twenty-first century socialism through the policies of the Correa administration. These policies
attempt to redefine oil policy through two policies: nationalization efforts whose accumulated
funds provide for social programs, and a legal framework that protects indigenous groups and the
Pachamama from extractive activities. President Correa has promised to diversify and work
towards a sustainable development strategy that moves away from this extractive industry and to
move towards a post-neoliberal economic model which deconstructs imperial economic
institutions and creates alternate development strategies. With these policies, and through careful
media depictions, he has distanced himself from Ecuador’s historical neoliberal political
economy.
Despite this carefully crafted image of Rafael Correa and his lofty agenda, many of
President Correa’s actions demonstrate that he is not exactly the environmental advocate,
indigenous champion, or national sovereignty leader which he claims to be. Many of his policies
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contradict his previously stated legal framework laid out in the 2008 constitution and associated
government documents El Plan Nacional Buen Vivir (Chapter 4). These documents describe
future development strategies and contribute to his twenty-first century socialist narrative. This
chapter will examine and analyze data from within the Correa administration (2007 - present) to
determine how successfully he has enacted substantive change that fit within his narrative. I will
examine oil exportation data, poverty indicators, social program spending, GDP, indigenous
right case studies, and national debt in order to understand what is new about Correa’s twentyfirst century socialist development strategy. Using data from the World Bank, the US Energy
Information Administration (EIA), IndexMundi, the Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the Ecuadorean government, and other sources, I will outline the
ways in which President Correa has, successfully or unsuccessfully, upheld his narrative of a
post-neoliberal, socially conscious, anti-imperial development strategy.
Oil Development and Diversification
Examining oil development in Ecuador before and during Correa’s regime is key to
exploring if oil production rates have truly decreased in order to fulfill the promises of buen
vivir. I will also explore whether Ecuador has attempted to diversify their income as a
component to the transition to post-neoliberalism. Reducing oil production is imperative to
transitioning to sustainable development as oil production is a harmful practice to the
environment and marginalized groups, and continues to leave Ecuador reliant on varying market
prices. Correa promises to bring about post-neoliberal development, to abandon the primary
extractivist policy of the past, and reduce hydrocarbon production. Unfortunately, these are not
the trends the data indicates. In Fig. 1 we see a historical graph from 2001 to 2013 depicting oil
production in Ecuador. This graph shows oil development has not decreased at all but rather has
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slightly increased throughout this twelve year period. From 2004 to 2013, oil production has
remained relatively stable, demonstrating no substantive change to oil production since Correa
took office in 2007. This oil production data demonstrates that Ecuador seems to be continuing
its investment in the extractive industry as opposed to transitioning to a new alternative.

Fig. 1 This figure shows oil production in Ecuador from 2001-2013. We see a steady trend
between the years 2004-2013. (IndexMundi, 2014).
The consistency of oil production from 2007-2013 highlights Ecuador’s economic
dependency on oil and an inability to diversify its income despite its commitment in the Plan
Nacional de Buen Vivir 2009-2013 to abandon the extractive export model. Oil as an export
continues to encompass a huge percentage of total exports, demonstrating a continued
dependency and a shortcoming in other industry as we can see in Fig. 2. Figure 2 shows that
under Correa’s administration crude petroleum has remained almost 50% of exports. This proves
that beyond Ecuador’s dependency on oil, other industries have also not been able to challenge
oil as a major export. Figure 3 similarly highlights Ecuador’s oil dependency as a product of
exportation and source of income. Figure 3 shows exports of goods disaggregated by industry,
where over ten years there has been little increase in income industry outside of the petroleum
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industry. This figure represents the share of GDP and shows that oil has consistently, and still is,
the greatest source of income for Ecuador. Further, Figure 4 demonstrates Ecuador’s reliance,
not only on oil, but on raw material resources as a whole. Instead of investing in industry or
industrial products that demonstrate higher skill sets and a typically higher market value, as
Strategy 2 of the Plan Nacional de Buen Vivir 2009-2013 states. Ecuador has consistently relied
on agro/extractive primary raw exports. Figure 4 depicts the share of primary goods and natural
resource based goods (i.e. oil) in Ecuador, Chile and Colombia. In Colombia we see a much
smaller share in exports based on raw materials than in Ecuador, where a majority of exports are
derived from raw materials (Colombia 75%, and Ecuador 91.2%). This figure also demonstrates
that Ecuador’s overall reliance on raw materials from 2002 to 2010 has remained the same. This
dependency on primary export and extraction shows an inherent lack of progress towards
diversification.
Crude Petroleum as a Percent of Total Exports
Years

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

Crude

43.5

36.5

50.3

54.5

56.2

51.2

53.3

Petroleum

Fig. 2- (ECLAC, 2013). This figure demonstrates Crude petroleum as a percentage of total
exports in Ecuador. From 2004-2012 we see a steady trend.
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Fig. 3- This figure demonstrates exports of goods disaggregated by industry as a share of GDP in
Ecuador. (Kozameh and Ray, 2012, p. 10)
Share of raw exports (primary exports and natural resource based manufactured goods) in
total exports
2002

2010

Total raw material exports

Total raw material exports

Chile

85.4

90.6

Colombia

65.9

75

Ecuador

91.9

91.2

Fig. 4-. This figure demonstrates the share of primary goods and natural resource based goods in
Ecuador, Chile and Colombia (Freire, 2011, p. 5).

42

However, it is important to consider the dates on many of these figures. Because much of
the data were from as early as 2010, it may be inappropriate to use them to demonstrate that oil
policy has not changed under Correa’s policies. Upon examining oil from 2008-2013, it is also
important to consider that oil prices were at a high during this time period. This might account
for the large proportion of GDP oil represents, despite claims to slow production. It also
demonstrates a conscious choice by the Correa administration to keep production the same,
rather than accelerating it in the face of high prices. Despite these considerations, the consistency
of oil and the decision to drill in Yasuní and other regions, demonstrates the administration’s
commitment to oil and hydrocarbons and an inadequacy in producing alternatives.
This lack of income diversification, consistent trend in oil production (Fig. 1) and oil as a
leading export (Fig. 2) highlights Ecuador’s dependency on hydrocarbons. Ecuador has made no
progress in expanding its income, especially through industry, and is forced to rely on primary
exports. Kennemore and Weeks argue this is far from a post-neoliberal strategy that lessens
dependency on other nations and looks to other sources of income beyond primary extraction.
They write that Correa has done little to “alter the economic model of extraction, leaving the
country dependent on global price fluctuations and foreign inputs” (Kennemore and Weeks,
2011, p. 277). This market instability makes it difficult for Correa to fulfill his election promises,
to develop the nation and alleviate poverty. Furthermore, Kennemore and Weeks state that he has
not only continued the model, but in some cases “accelerated production in many extractive
industries” (Kenmore and Weeks, 2011, p. 277). Ecuador’s inability to give up on oil, even at the
expense of the environment and indigenous groups, especially in the Yasuní case study,
demonstrates Ecuador’s heavy dependency and perhaps the failure of twenty-first century
socialism policies in upholding the 2008 constitution.
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President Correa and the Alianza Pais party have done little to shift away from oil
production and develop alternate industry. The Yasuní case study, in which President Correa is
intentionally drilling in an area that protects indigenous groups and houses great biodiversity,
shows a preference for extractivism over the values of buen vivir. This is the first crack in the
Correa narrative. Instead of choosing to continue to invest in oil production, Yasuní is an
opportunity to transition to post-neoliberalism. The Yasuní case study, and other hydrocarbon
policies, demonstrate the government's complacency or inability to transition to a new economic
form.
Government Spending on Poverty
Though Correa’s policies to develop a diversified and less dependent economy have not
been successful as of yet, I would like to explore whether the Correa administration has
successfully collected oil profits from the extractive industry in order to increase government
spending. Increasing government spending and using the funds to assist the poor, have been key
components to President Correa’s strategy in transforming Ecuador into a twenty-first century
socialist model that accounts for its people and is truly dedicated to ameliorating poverty. This
“petro-populism,” the use of oil revenues in ameliorating poverty, justifies oil extraction as a
means to change poverty rates. These oil funds are used to support programs started under the
Correa administration, such as Bono de la Vivienda and Bono de Desarrollo Humano (as
discussed in Chapter 4) which use grants to assist impoverished and traditionally ignored groups.
This section explores whether, through oil nationalization policies, the government has been able
to capture more profit from extractive activities. How has government spending changed under
the Correa administration, and has it increased spending in social and poverty alleviation
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programs? How have poverty indicators changed due to the existence of such government
programs?
First, one must examine how government spending has changed under the Correa
administration. In Figure 5, the graph depicts quarterly government spending in US dollars from
1990-2015. Government Spending refers to public expenditure on goods and services (Trading
Economics, 2016). This figure shows an increase in government spending from 2000 to 2015.
Although the trend begins earlier than Correa’s presidency it nonetheless depicts an increase in
government spending during his time in office.

Fig. 5- The graph depicts from 1990-2015 Ecuador government spending in US dollars. (Trading
Economics, 2016).
This increase in government spending has been used to create the social programs
discussed in Chapter 4 that focus on impoverished groups. With the rise in government spending
President Correa has managed to change the distribution of oil wealth by investing the profit in
social programs. Figure 6 depicts this increase in government spending on social programs. This
figure depicts government spending as a percentage of GDP in Ecuador between 2004-2011.
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After 2006, spending as a percentage of GDP on social programs has increased from 4.8% of
total GDP to a high of 9.5% in 2010. That means that between 2006 and 2009, social spending
nearly doubled as a percent of GDP. Ray and Kozameh write “In fact, government spending on
education did double – from 2.6 to 5.2 percent of GDP – and spending on social welfare more
than doubled – from 0.7 to 1.8 percent of GDP” (Ray and Kozameh, 2012, p. 12). This figure
also provides insight on social sector spending. The graph shows that “Education” has been a
large component in the social programs developed under Correa’s administration.

Fig. 6- This figure depicts government spending as a percentage of GDP in Ecuador between
2004-2011. (Kozameh and Ray, 2012, p. 13).
Perhaps due to the increase observed in government and social program spending, we
have seen a dramatic decline in poverty in Ecuador. As Becker writes of the Correa
administration, “All social indicators [appear] to be moving in a positive direction: poverty has
dropped, employment is up, wages were up, literacy and health measurements are up, and the
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equality gap is closing” (Becker, 2013, p. 43). In this section, I will examine citizens living
below the poverty line as well as unemployment rates. Figure 7 shows the population in Ecuador
below the poverty line from 1999 to 2013. This figure shows the general decrease in population
below the poverty line. Though this graph demonstrates from 2007- on a decrease in poverty,
this trend extends past 2007 and the Correa administration, to 1999. This means that this
decreasing trend of poverty cannot be completely associated with President Correa’s “buen
vivir” strategies.

Fig. 7- This figure depicts from 1999 to 2013 the population in Ecuador below the poverty line
(IndexMundi, 2014)
Unemployment rate is another effective tool to measure poverty short-term and analyze
the results of both programming and spending under the Correa administration. The graph in
Figure 8 depicts unemployment rate in Ecuador between 2000 and 2013. The unemployment
rate, seen in Figure 8, shows a general decreasing trend past the 2007 mark. This graph is
perhaps more telling as unemployment between 2000 and 2006 is unstable. While after 2007,
there is a steady trend in unemployment at 8%. After 2009, unemployment drops heavily where
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in 2013 we see unemployment as low as 4.2%. This demonstrates a clear drop of unemployment
during the Correa administration.

Fig. 8- This graph depicts unemployment rate in Ecuador between 2000 and 2013 (IndexMundi,
2014).
Under Correa’s administration, regardless of whether it deserves complete credit,
Ecuador has seen a general decline in poverty rates. Both unemployment rates and people living
below the poverty line have dropped throughout the 2007- 2013 period. At the same time we
have seen a rise in government spending in social programs. Though these two issues cannot be
said to have a directly causal relationship, they may be correlated. This might reflect upon the
effectiveness of the Correa administration’s social programs. However, there are important
considerations to examine before making direct conclusions. The high oil prices, and therefore
greater funds, of the 2008-2013 period could have had an enormous effect on government social
spending and poverty indicators in general. This leaves observers to predict Ecuador’s future
poverty rates and to further examine the effectiveness of these social programs without the extra
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funds of this period. It will be important to the future of Ecuador as predicted oil prices continue
to drop (2014-on) and may influence social indicators.
Correa’s social programs, funded through oil policy, may have had some degree of
impact on poverty rates. If so, this would be a large accomplishment for the Correa
administration which has used these programs as justification for its less than perfect oil policy.
Though in part fulfilling the mission of buen vivir by accounting for marginalized and
impoverished peoples and working to better the lives of its citizens, it disproportionately
damages the lives of indigenous groups through the continuation of extractive policy. Though the
Correa administration may have fulfilled one component of its twenty-first century socialist
transformation, its consistent oil policy prohibits its ability to further pursue a post-neoliberal
strategy that looks for alternatives, protects indigenous peoples, and creates sustainable
development through diversification.
Indigenous rights

Image 1. President Correa in the Amazon Rainforest displays the oil on his hand (Barrett, 2014)
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President Correa has worked diligently to curate his image as a “Champion of indigenous
rights,” an activist, and a politician committed to the values of “buen vivir.” He has attempted to
construct this image of himself through various policies such as the “inclusion” of indigenous
groups and rights in the creation of the 2008 constitution, the appropriation of “sumak kawsay”
to the construction of buen vivir, and with carefuly composed media attention. Image 1
demonstrates one such media image in an anti-Chevron commercial, referring to the current
Chevron lawsuit between Chevron (before Texaco), and indigenous communities damaged by
Texaco’s extraction. This commercial depicts Correa with his hand dripping with oil. His role in
this commercial is to condemn Chevron, and to depict “the dirty hand of Chevron” in order to
draw support from indigenous groups and environmentalists. Further, these media images have
been used to demonstrate the difference between President Correa and previous administrations.
They function to depict the “disparities” between the administrations who facilitated the
atrocities of the Chevron case and President Correa, a supposed environmentalist. Despite these
images and Correa’s narrative, oil policy has not nearly changed enough for Correa to cite these
disparities between him and past administrations. Though President Correa has invested money
in social programs that help traditionally marginalized groups, like indigenous groups, it is ironic
that these funds stem from the extractive industry, an industry that has encroached on
indigenous’ rights. His continued hydrocarbon policies continue to displace indigenous peoples
and damage the local environments surrounding them. In this fashion, President Correa has
failed to provide the “sumak kawsay” (good living) practices to the indigenous groups he claims
to prioritize. Instead, President Correa has created many policies that in fact hamper indigenous
movements through policies that attempt to suppress protests and alternate voices, and through
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the prioritization of the hydrocarbon industry that disproportionately affect indigenous
populations.
Rafael Correa and his administration have enacted many policies that regulate media,
protests, and NGOs in an attempt to muffle voices of dissent and indigenous protest. These
policies have intentionally hindered indigenous movements, contrary to Correa’s framing of
himself as an indigenous rights activist, by shutting down indigenous organizations and protests
that have expressed discontent with current hydrocarbon policies. Such actions from the Correa
administration have been so extreme as to dissolve NGOs who have disagreed with his policies,
especially NGOs who have protested against further drilling in the Amazon. The most famous
example of this was the shutting down of the NGO, the Fundacion Pachamama, for “disturbing
the peace” during a protest against the expansion of oil concessions (Lang, 2013). The
Fundacion Pachamama denies all allegations of violence, and its dissolution is seen by many
leftists as a muffling of dissent, rather than the suspension of a violent group (Lang, 2013).
Further efforts of the Correa administration in shutting down opposition has been threatening and
targeting leaders of movements. In 2014, the Ecuadorean Secretary of Hydrocarbons filed a
formal complaint against eight indigenous leaders for making “threats” against the government
during oil auctions (LLewelyn, 2014). It was recommended that they be arrested for protesting.
These attempts to quiet voices of dissent are dismantling indigenous groups and civil society’s
participation in democratic government. It intentionally hampers indigenous movements in order
to continue Ecuador’s hydrocarbon dependency. These actions demonstrate a clear prioritization
of oil over indigenous rights, going so far as to even muffle the indigenous groups that protest
these actions.
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The continuation and expansion of hydrocarbon activities under the Correa
administration in mostly indigenous lands proves that not much has changed since the neoliberal
Ecuadorean era. Policies enacted under Rafael Correa’s presidency such as the 2009 mining act
depict the administration’s commitment to hydrocarbon activities. This law was approved with
the intention of creating new jobs and growing the economy, but critics condemn it for being
neoliberal and racist (Becker, 2011, p. 56). Beyond encouraging multinational hydrocarbon
companies to mine in Ecuador, which contrasts Correa’s nationalization goals, it allowed
companies to commence activity without consent of the rural communities. These hydrocarbon
policies have set off huge indigenous protests as CONAIE, Ecuador’s national indigenous
movement, have argued that new mining projects will pollute indigenous lands and harm
communities. Marlon Santi, President of CONAIE said “From the point of view of the social
movements, and the indigenous movement in particular, Correa’s socialism is not socialism at
all.... He waves the flag of socialism, but he does other things.” (Chicaiza, 2009)
Lastly, the Yasuní case study further demonstrates how Correa’s commitment to
indigenous rights is weak. If this twenty-first century socialist administration truly believed in a
transition of post neoliberal strategies that promote “sumak kawsay”, there would not be an issue
of the exclusion of indigenous groups and the encroachment of their rights. President Correa’s
decision to drill in Yasuní, despite constitutional safeguards in protecting voluntarily isolated
indigenous territory, proves that he is indeed not committed to indigenous rights or postneoliberal development, but instead has taken on a historical view of indigenous peoples and
their land, as a barrier to development, and as “tierras baldías”, empty lands to be exploited by
the state in order to obtain resources. His intentional muffling of NGOs, his exclusion of
indigenous groups in decision making processes, and his continued commitment to hydrocarbon
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policies clearly depict President Correa discredit his own constructed image of a “progressive
activist.”
Dependency and Loans
Anti-imperialism has been a key factor in Correa’s rise to popularity, and other leftist
parties in Latin America. It represents a backlash against foreign involvement in State issues and
a push for independent markets. In this manner President Correa has promoted policies like
defaulting on its debt, joining trade groups such as ALBA, and promoting nationalization and
import substitution strategies, as discussed in Chapter 4. These policies were meant to separate
the Correa administration from the United States and other traditionally imperial powers.
However, his hydrocarbon and oil policy guarantees his link to these systems as he is dependent
on their cash for his social programs to run. This irony again points at the contradiction in
twenty-first century socialism in the Andean region: its hydrocarbon policy and its dependency
on Northern nations and markets.
Correa’s consistency in supporting the oil industry comes with the baggage of a
dependency on U.S. markets for oil exports and pricing. Figure 9 demonstrates this dependency
of U.S. buying power as it shows crude oil exports in 2013 and their destinations. In Fig. 9, the
U.S. received 63% of all Ecuadorean crude oil. Figure 10 furthers this point by showing the
export of goods to destination countries by billions of dollars. Looking at this chart, we can see
the United States by far spends the most money on Ecuadorean exports, spending as much as 9.3
billion in 2008. There are no trends that seem to be related to Correa’s election in 2007 in this
figure. Both of these figures further the argument that oil as a resource and strategy is inherently
dependent on imperial powers through the United States’ large need for petroleum. It contradicts
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the notion that the Correa administration has been able to achieve sovereignty from imperial
powers as his entire system of governance depends upon them.
Annual Ecuadorean Crude Oil Exports, 2013

Fig. 9- Figure 9 shows crude oil exports in 2013 and their destinations. (EIA, 2015).
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Fig. 10- Figure 10 furthers this point by showing the export of goods to destination countries by
billions of dollars. (Kozameh and Ray, 2012, p. 11).
Further, not only has the Correa administration been unable to delink itself from the
United States, it has surrendered itself to another dependent relationship, one with China. Since
2008 when it defaulted on its loans, Ecuador has borrowed over $11 billion from China (Kuo,
2014). The EIA reported that many of these loans were oil-for-loan deals that guaranteed future
oil exports to China (EIA, 2015). The EIA wrote that “the loans also require Ecuador to invest a
share of the loaned amount into projects involving Chinese companies and have been applied to
the development of hydroelectric complexes and other energy-related projects”(EIA, 2015).
Many of the unpopular mining laws were made in conjunction with these loans, allowing the
Chinese government to invest and profit from these projects.
Oil has become a source of dependency for Ecuador. Beyond the changing market prices
that makes this economic model unstable and prone to boom-bust cycles, it has made them
dependent on the very nations it wished to detach from. In the creation of the anti-imperial
narrative that criticizes the United States’ influence and conditionalities, they have replaced them
with a new power, China. By continuing oil policies, Correa will be unable to achieve the
sovereignty he preaches.
Conclusion
Though President Correa has constructed a model for twenty-first century socialism based
on the values of post-neoliberalism, diversification, sustainability, and buen vivir, there has been
little evidence of such a system. President Correa’s commitment to oil production and inability to
seek alternatives in other industries is a central contradictory flaw. Though rising oil prices and
greater profit through nationalization policies have funded important social programs that
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achieve the goals of buen vivir, there are huge fundamental contradictions that exist within a
system that promotes harmony with the environment and people but relies on such a detrimental
resource. Hydrocarbon extraction has historically, and continues to infringe upon the rights of
indigenous groups through the environmental damage seen in the surrounding environments.
Hydrocarbon extraction often occurs on indigenous lands in both the Amazon and the rural
highlands, perhaps due to the concept of tierras baldías and erasure of indigenous territory,
highlighting the environmental racism in such policies. Oil extraction demonstrates a clear
prioritization of hydrocarbon industry over human rights, and a contradiction of Ecuador’s buen
vivir values. The other major contradiction of values juxtaposed by the twenty-first century
socialist model is in the struggle for sovereignty. Despite a narrative that seeks nationalism and
rails against imperial world systems, oil remains a key tie huge in linking Ecuador to the United
States. The inability to diversify and move away from oil to seek new alternatives remains the
biggest obstacle in achieving a model that truly promotes post-neoliberalism and buen vivir.
In learning the facts and flaws of Ecuador’s twenty-first century socialist model, it
prompts the recognition of the true differences between historical and current development
strategies. In the next chapter I will critique and discuss President Correa’s development strategy
and argue that the system seen today is not post-neoliberal, but simply neo-extractivist with a
comprehensive narrative.
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Chapter 6
An Analysis of Ecuador’s Development Model

Twenty-first century socialism as a model, though in existence for nine years in Ecuador,
has aroused more questions than have been answered regarding what are the true values of this
movement. The previous chapter discusses the values and trends seen in Ecuador throughout this
period in an attempt to understand, beyond the constructed narrative of Rafael Correa, what does
twenty-first century socialism look like in action? What are its actual development strategies and
policies being enacted and how do they differ from the formulated narrative? In this chapter,
using the conclusions from the previous chapter, I will explore whether President Correa is truly
moving towards a post-neoliberal alternative, or if he is simply engaging in neo-extractivist
policies that are defended by his narrative of sovereignty and anti-neoliberalism. I argue that the
twenty-first century socialist development strategy does fall short of its projected values, and
instead resembles the model of neo-extractivism. This triggers the question what is the future of
this movement? Can Ecuador ever truly reflect the values of buen vivir, and post-neoliberalism
in a neoliberal world?
New Oil Development Strategy?
So what is new about the New Left’s oil development strategy? According to the
Ecuadorean economist Alberto Acosta, former minister of mines and environment, there has
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been no structural transformation of accumulation or development under twenty-first century
socialism (Ruiz Marrero, 2011). The previous chapter demonstrates there has been no
substantive change in development policy, with many policies reflecting similar strategies of
neoliberal institutions. The government has still been reduced to depending on a primary
economy based on oil. Despite rhetoric, the constitution, and some encouraging policies that
promote equality, the transformation of power, and the developing of post-neoliberal strategies
that move beyond a primary economy and the extraction of the earth, twenty-first century
socialism seems to not go as far as first hoped. Instead of a new revolutionary model of
development, we still see a traditional system that continues to promote a problematic
accumulation model. This problematic accumulation model that promotes traditional extractive
development models commits three flaws that prohibit the movement’s ability to forward its own
values and match its narrative. The first is the destruction and exploitation of resources, even at
the expense of local peoples. Oil, and other hydrocarbons such as gas, are invasive extractions
that leave many opportunities for companies to spill and pollute local environments. Beyond
spills, the building of roads and pipelines also damage habitats and local people's’ lives. Drilling
on indigenous lands encroach upon these groups’ rights to health, livelihood, and territory. These
violations contradict the notion of “buen vivir” and the establishment of human, and
environmental rights in the 2008 Constitution. The second, is the reliance on a primary economy
with a resource that is market dependent. This contradicts the values and goals of post-neoliberal
development strategies laid out in the government document the Plan Nacional de Buen Vivir
2009-2013 which states the need to diversify, create industry, and develop a more sustainable
resource. Also, the dependency on U.S. buyers and U.S. funding make oil a link to traditional
imperial powers. Lastly, despite claims to be anti-imperialist and anti-Northern, President Correa
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has not been able to break from traditional “Northern economic development models” that
circulate primary materials to imperial nations in a system that mimics colonialism (Becker,
2013, p. 47). By not altering the economic model of extraction, leaving the country dependent on
global price fluctuations and foreign inputs and relying on harmful extraction practices that have
in the past displaced people, damaged the environment, and affected the health and livelihood of
indigenous peoples, it is directly contradicting three of its core values; buen vivir, postneoliberalism and anti-imperialism (Kennemore and Weeks, 2011, p. 271).
In this development strategy, the only change seen is that of the state’s role in the
extractive economy (Chapter 4). These development strategies have simply nationalized the
industry, but none have yet successfully shifted away from a primary economy. Kennemore and
Weeks state “These new economic policies have not signaled a dramatic shift towards a new
economic model but rather a pragmatic way for center-left governments to better capture
capitalist surplus in the exploitation of natural resources” (Kennemore and Weeks, 2011, p. 271).
It is not a revolutionary system that completely rejects traditional paradigms of development; it is
instead a system that has increased the power of the state in its own economy. Twenty-first
century socialism modifies exploitative resources through government control and using oil rents
to fund social programs. The only fundamental change is the role of the state, and the primacy of
politics in oil development (Hogenboom and Jiberto, 2009, p. 99). Though this has led to some
positive changes, such as the expansion of social programs and declining poverty rates (Chapter
5), it comes at the expense of local peoples (usually indigenous groups) and the sacrifice of
important key values that have made twenty-first century socialism a “citizen’s revolution.”
The reliance on a primary economy, a continuation of extractivist policy, and a disregard
for constitutional rights indicate that the strategies developed under twenty-first century
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socialism are far from being a post-neoliberal alternative. These flaws seen in the extractive
development strategy demonstrate that perhaps less has changed and more has stayed the same in
this creation of a “new “development strategy.
Neo-extractivism
Critics then, argue that the trend in Latin America, especially with countries that have
traditionally large extractive economies such as Bolivia, Venezuela and Ecuador, have not
created a new twenty-first century socialist paradigm, but have solely created a system of neoextractivism that still fits within the model of neoliberalism. Neo-extractivism is a system that
still prioritizes extraction, neocolonialism, and dependency. Neo-extractivism relies on
traditional extractive development models and export-led growth, but is governed by an
economic policy of rearrangement (Katz, 2007, p. 27). Because of the Correa administration’s
failure to completely dissolve old extractive models and its use of nationalization as a tool to
reclaim funds, I argue that current development strategies truly reflect neo-extractivism, rather
than the post-neoliberal strategies Correa promotes. Do current strategies truly align with this
model? How has this model been used within a twenty-first century socialist model, and what is
the future for such a model?
Neo-extractivism firstly, is an economic model that relies on a heavy extractive policy.
The form of production remains traditional in that it is defined by the primary products
exported. These primary products, in Ecuador’s case, are oil, mineral resources and agroproduction. It depends on the exploitation of natural resources. This extractive model continues
upon traditional notions of extractivism in which some (historically colonized) countries
extracted and exported primary products, while others (imperial and “Northern” nations)
produced and manufactured. Considering the traditional primary dependence on an extractive
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resource, the current oil development strategies reflect this component. Oil as a key export, in
both product and income, highlights, again, the primacy of an extractive export economy. This,
and Correa’s inability to diversify away from solely primary activities demonstrates that this first
component of neo-extractivism is true to Ecuador’s current development strategy.
The second key to neo-extractivism is expanding government control. The role of the
state in neo-extractivism is much greater than traditional extractive models. This increased state
role for extractive industries is an attempt to: capture more profits, reduce corruption and prevent
extractive wealth from leaving the country through foreign investment. Through nationalization
policies, Correa has fulfilled this second component. The policies laid out in Chapter 4 that
restructure profit and nationalize resource extraction, have allowed President Correa to reverse
the trend of capital flow away from transnational corporations to remaining under state control.
This has allowed him to redistribute funds in a manner that attempts to restructure accumulation.
It has led to the expansion of social programs under the administration and an attempt to have a
greater distribution of funds from this continuation of extractive policy (Ruiz Marrero 2011).
Because of the fulfillment of these two component, critics argue that Ecuador’s “new”
development strategies seen under twenty-first century socialism is nothing more than neoextractivism. Valdivia argues that the goal of the administration has never been to stop
extractivism, despite the narrative originally written by Correa, but instead it has been their
intention “to transform the mechanisms through which this resource serves the Ecuadorian
collective” (Valdivia, 2008, p. 457). Neo-extractivism allows this administration to assert
sovereignty over a valued resource, while it attempts to redistribute the funds from traditional
patterns.
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Despite this attempt at the redistribution of oil funds in order to lessen inequality, this
component of the neo-extractivist development strategy does not truly address the concentration
of wealth or change the structural patterns of accumulation (Ruiz Marrero, 2011). The
establishment of social programs, based on an unreliable funding source, oil, does not
fundamentally address the issue of structural inequality in Latin America, begging the question
what happens when oil prices drop, as they start to do in 2014. Though this greater state control
has allowed the creation of successful social programs, it is not fundamentally changing the
systems of inequality. It also purposefully ignores the harmful social and environmental impacts
of extracting by only focusing on ameliorating “general poverty.”
The concept of neo-extractivism has been used to do important political work for the
Correa administration. It creates a dynamic in which the increased dependency on the extractive
industry to fund social programs, and the social authority gained through such programs, is used
to justify the continuation and expansion of more extractive activities to continue these
legitimate programs (Burbach et. al., 2013, p. 41). It frames a narrative in which extractivism is
a necessary evil, a need to continue the social benefits of before. This justification of extractive
policies has been an important component to Correa’s response to criticism over policies such as
the mining act and the decision to drill in Yasuní-ITT. Neo-extractivism also functions as a
political tool that can gain power and support for the Alianza party. Neo-extractivism, through its
social programs “dampens social discontent by alleviating the worst excesses of neoliberalism”
and has allowed for President Correa to remain popular, even as his narrative cracks (Burbach et.
al., 2013, p. 42). This popularity allows him to continue his extractive policies without creating
real alternatives that challenge structural inequality and social issues.
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But what is the future for this economic model? Can President Correa sustain this model
and his popularity? Neo-extractivism, as it is dependent on oil, is therefore limited by its ability
to be long lasting and sustainable. Oil’s dependency on the international market makes this
system one prone to fluctuations and a declining market as energy companies seek alternative
fuels. As oil prices continue to decline in 2016 we will see how this model survives, and whether
Correa’s popularity survives with it.
The Narrative
The Latin American Left, due to large control over media, the framing of the new
constitutions, and contradictory environmental/extractive policies has been able to construct a
narrative of environmentalism, of pro-indigenous, and of sovereignty. The issues with oil that
have arisen from the ITT proposal has allowed Correa “to reposition himself and Ecuador as a
‘new’ Ecuador transitioning from a petro state plagued by neocolonialism to a populist
democracy where subsoil minerals belong to the people” (Davidov, 2012, p. 14). Though the
constructed narrative can be used to contradict the neo-extractivist policies in Ecuador (2008
Constitution, El Planificación de Buen Vivir) it can also be used to justify the flaws of such
policies. Through anti-neoliberal and anti-imperial rhetoric, President Correa has attempted to
justify his extraction policies and his inability to transition to new alternatives.
Because the movement of twenty-first century socialism had arisen from a need for social
change and as a backlash to systems of imperialism and neoliberalism, it has allowed for the
development of a narrative that presents any sort of substitute to hyper capitalism, to pro-market
reform, to neocolonialism to be seen as a true “alternative” (Arditi, 2008, p. 71). This narrative is
what allows neo-extractivism to exist. It is at least an alternative that attempts to alleviate the
worst symptoms of neoliberalism for most Ecuadoreans. It is heralded as a “better than before”
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system, a system in which most of the population benefits now, while only a minority face the
repercussions of extractivism. This becomes dangerous as it justifies the denial of human rights
and the betrayal of constitutional law. Neo-extractivism, therefore, prioritizes the economic over
the environmental, the national over the local; in a theme that almost mimics the utilitarian
thought ‘for the greater good’ (Latorre & Santillana, 2009, p. 14).
An anti-Northern, anti-imperialist narrative has also functioned as a political tool to
justify the neo-extractivism seen in Ecuador. Through anti-Northern rhetoric, the Latin American
Left has been known to justify its extractive policies through “indiscriminate exploitation.” By
arguing that Northern countries want us to conserve our natural resources in order to hinder our
development and stunt competition, they have created a conflict between “Latin America and
The North” with winners and losers (Farthing, 2009, p. 28). Asserting sovereignty, and triumph,
therefore means exploiting natural resources. This anti-Northern discourse, also seen in the
explanation of the failure of the ITT proposal, has become instrumental in the justification of oil
extraction, despite its clear contradictions.
These justifications become dangerous as they fail to question alternate realities (Latorre
& Santillana, 2009, p. 15). They fail to ignite a level of popular consciousness that questions
neo-extractivism as post-neoliberal or allows for the imagination of a post-extractivist society.
The narrative of being anti-imperialist has replaced the need for an alternative strategy. As
Latorre and Santilla argue, “this type of model…places neoliberalism as the main enemy, leaving
aside discussion on a society post-capitalist…” (Latorre, S. & A. Santillana, 2009, p. 16).
President Correa’s framing of conflict, us v. them, U.S. v. Ecuador is how neo-extractivism has
been able to survive despite the broken campaign promises and ignored legalities that state
otherwise.
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President Correa, despite the clear contradictions of pursuing a neo-extractivist
development strategy has borrowed and cut from his own twenty-first century socialist narrative
to twist a justification for such policies. Relying on anti-neoliberal, anti-imperial rhetoric, he has
created a struggle between components that place oil as the means of the conflict. Only through
the development of oil does Ecuador conquer “neoliberalism” and “imperialism.”
The Defense
However, in defense of the twenty-first century socialism model that has taken a recent
sweep of Latin America, any model that that exists within the neoliberal world will lead to the
continuation of extraction (Katz, 2007, p. 34). Ecuador still has to function in a world that is
primarily neoliberal, and to remain commercially competitive, they have decided to continue
with extraction. It triggers the question, how much power does Ecuador, or the entire Latin
American left have to construct their economic model? With greater powers like the IMF, the
World Bank along with limited resources, could Ecuador, even theoretically, break from the
extractivist neoliberal system and move towards post-neoliberal strategies on its own? Though
the movement has multiple flaws and contradictions, it has been at least an attempt in an
assertion of sovereignty against Northern dominant systems.
Twenty-first century socialism, despite its criticisms and limitations with a neoextractivist policy, has taken steps towards a post-neoliberal development strategy, a postextractive model. Post-extractivism does not necessarily mean “rejecting the exploitation of
natural resources but to establish the biophysical limits of exploitation, reach sustainability, [and]
eliminate poverty"(Ruiz Marrero, 2011). Further it is a transition, long-term, to a post-oil
economy which could take years to enact. Initiatives such as the ITT proposal and the
constitution move towards these issues, however the actions of the administration need to match
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the narrative the left is creating. Roger Burbach, Michael Fox, and Federico Fuentes argue in
Correa’s defense, “To expect this to change in a decade or so is entirely unrealistic” (Burbach et.
al., 2013, p. 165). It is a long term proposition to change the traditional economies of Latin
America to a sustainable model that is truly post-neoliberal. Further, it is difficult to charge a
nation, or a movement to completely break with dominant systems, world systems like
neoliberalism and “neocolonialism” that control trade and globalization.
Though this administration has not fulfilled the hopes it had first promised, by creating a
systematic alternative to neoliberalism, it has at least created a petro state that has attempted to
lessen margins of inequality. These social programs created to alleviate the symptoms of
neoliberalism gives social legitimacy to the Correa administration in creating a “socialist system”
that supports its people through its resources. Correa defends his heavy extractive position by
maintaining that “anything could be used for good or evil and that he [is] determined to use
Ecuador’s natural resources to create a positive development model” (Becker, 2013, p. 55).
Though critics argue that this model demonstrates a failure of twenty-first century socialism and
limitations as a viable post-neoliberal development strategy, it is at least attempts to be
accountable to its people for its extractive actions in the world system. As Dieterich writes, “In
the contemporary Third World, this is the only possible way of economic development for a
popular project. It is the lesser evil against neoliberalism” (Dieterich, 2005).
Though twenty-first century socialism has disappointingly promoted a neo-extractivist
development strategy, it has at least made attempts through legal framework to lessen the
externalities of a neoliberal extractivist economy. The creation of framework to protect the
environment and indigenous groups and social programs could lessen the impacts of such a
destructive system if held accountable. Neo-extractivism falls short in that it doesn’t create an
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alternative to neoliberalism, however, perhaps that is impossible for a developing nation in a
globalized system of neoliberalism and neocolonialism.
The Solution: Civil Society?
Twenty-first century socialism’s development strategy has failed to meet the needs of
buen vivir and post-neoliberalism. Because it prioritizes the state over the local, extraction over
the environment, and the “greater good” over marginalized indigenous groups, it cannot be
considered the viable post-neoliberal strategy President Correa claims to be. Neo-extractivism,
with the increased role of the state, has been able to improve the lives of most Ecuadorean
citizens through social programs, at the expense of others. NGOs and indigenous movements
have protested the violation of human rights, but to no avail. So what is, or what should be the
role of civil society in ensuring that the needs of marginalized peoples are measured? How can
twenty-first century socialism work to fix and truly protect local peoples affected by extraction?
Twenty-first century socialism has been led through the increased role of the state which
has been able to make positive changes that expand social programs and help redistribute oil
funds. However, the greater role of the state is not always a force that has been used to improve
the lives of Ecuadoreans. The increased role of state has also been used negatively to control
media and to shut down the role of civil society in political decisions. It has shut down NGOs
that disagree with its extractivist policies and has attempted to suppress and dissenting voices, or
discredit them by insisting they are “right critics” or “environmental infantiles.” Despite an
established legal framework that claims to protect indigenous groups and environmental
concerns, the government has yet to be held accountable for its current policies. Without an
accountable framework to stand for these issues of social justice, sustainable development in
Latin America will never be reached (Hogenboom and Jiberto, 2009, p. 99).
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The inclusion of civil society into twenty-first century socialism would push for this
accountability, especially for marginalized groups who suffer disproportionately from
extractivist policies. The involvement of civil society, in partnership with the neo-extractivist
left, could lead to a revised agenda, that does not only include regulation and redistribution of the
extractive export industry, but also include “policies and practices that empower rural peoples to
determine the terms of local development and to participate in the broader national and
international processes” (Hogenboom, and Fernandez Jiberto, 2009, p. 99). The Correa
administration which has traditionally shut down such voices could truly transform its
administration with their inclusion.
The “oppression” of civil society has weakened the New Left’s ability to achieve true
post-neoliberalism. If NGOs, indigenous organizations, and environmental activists were
included in the decision-making process and had their voices heard, twenty-first century
socialism could begin to make substantial changes that could pressure this movement to adhere
to its values of buen vivir and make their framework accountable. Working together, civil society
and the twenty-first century socialist government could begin to create a practical reality that
creates real alternatives to extractivism and neoliberalism. This political move to include civil
society is an important step for Ecuador to realize its sovereignty and to truly develop the
twenty-first century socialist model.
Conclusion
So what is new about twenty-first century socialism’s development strategy? How does it
reflect historical development strategies? The development strategy seen under President
Correa’s administration seems to have had little change from the development strategies that
occupied the “neoliberal era.” The continuation of heavy oil production, the dependency on this
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primary product for revenue, the reliance on foreign nations for loans, whether the United States
or China, all reflect neoliberal development strategies, despite the promise for change. The
adopting of “neo-extractivism” in development policies does demonstrate a change, however. It
demonstrates a change in state control, and an increase in funding for government social
programs. However, is this just a reflection of the I.S.I nationalization model of the 30s-60s?
Ultimately, the twenty-first century socialist development strategy is not a post-neoliberal
alternative as President Correa has claimed, but rather solely a system of neo-extractivism.
Though this model has been justified using Correa’s narrative of anti-neoliberal and anti-imperial
rhetoric, critics point out the contradictions it creates with other twenty-first century socialist
values: buen vivir and post-neoliberalism. The ignoring of these values allows the model to fail
in three huge ways, in exploiting indigenous peoples and the environment, in continuing a
foreign dependency on an unstable resource, and in creating a dependency on US, or China,
funds. The apparent contradictions between twenty-first century socialist values and the reality
of continued extractivism point at the failure of the Correa administration to create new
development strategies that uphold the values of the movement.
However, others who are sympathetic to the Latin American “New Left” argue that the
neo-extractivist development model is the only alternative for a “developing nation” subject to
the neoliberal global capitalist society. This model represents the only alternative to a nation who
wishes to remain competitive. This argument questions Ecuador’s ability, or any “developing”
nations’ ability to break from the global neoliberal market. It justifies Ecuador’s assertion of
sovereignty over oil resources, and applauds the attempt made at distancing itself from imperial
nations. Further, even if possible for such a nation to change development strategies and create
new alternatives, it would be a long-term transition. Isn’t nine years too short to to completely
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create a post-oil, post-neoliberal model? However, if this long term transition is to happen
successfully, the inclusion of civil society will be an important tool for the model to truly include
the values of buen vivir and protect marginalized groups affected by the extractive industry.
Though the twenty-first century socialist development strategy has further to go if it is to reach
its goals and values, there is still hope for such a system to continue to push back against the
dogmatic neoliberal development model.
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Chapter 7
Yasuní Discussion and Conclusion

Twenty-first century socialism and its development model are complex in that it “is riddled by
contradictions” (Lomnitz, 2006). It is a system that claims to include the environment and
indigenous rights in its framework, but continues with extractive production that has historically
(and even recently) relocated indigenous groups and has prohibited these groups from practicing
their culture and livelihood through the pollution of water and air. It is a system that claims to be
anti-imperialist, which seeks to assert sovereignty, but relies on a primary export model that
leaves it dependent on market and western nations. It uses anti-US, anti-IMF discourse to fuel its
policies, yet accepts heavy loans from China that reflect historical relations between the
developed and developing. Besides its failings in its model that attempts to restructure a system
still somewhat dependent on the western world and neoliberalism, it's the contradictions between
its narratives and its actions that are this model’s worst characteristic. Though Correa and other
Latin American leftist leaders, have committed and taken steps toward creating a post-extractive
model in their constitutions and have taken on different forms of indigenous philosophy such as
“buen vivir,” the Yasuní ITT case demonstrates how superficial these concepts can be (Ruiz
Marrero, 2011). Yasuní ITT initiative demonstrates not only the narrative of “buen vivir” but the
implications of neo-extractivism.
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The Buen Vivir Narrative
The Yasuní ITT initiative, despite its failure, still accomplished huge political work for
Rafael Correa and twenty-first century socialism. With this initiative dedicated to preserving the
Amazon and with the intention of reversing the extractive economy, President Correa was able to
frame himself as a post-extractive leader, as an environmentalist, and as pro-indigenous. With its
failure, the burden laid on the “Northern” world, as President Correa famously said “The world
has failed us…” Yasuní only functioned as a narrative, to assert a commitment to the principles
of “buen vivir” and to assert anti-”developed” views. Kennemore and Weeks propose that this
commitment to the “revolutionary” ITT proposal from the Correa administration was able to
muffle much of the criticism from environmental groups (Kennemore and Weeks, 2011, p. 276).
Despite an increase in extractive production under Rafael Correa, the ITT proposal was still able
to frame Correa as an environmentalist and excuse many of his extractive policies. With its
failure, the political work of ITT has been less substantial and shows the weakness of the
administration’s narratives. Though the proposal attempts to shift blame to “developed” nations
and contribute to its anti-imperial rhetoric, the decision to drill in Yasuní demonstrates the
administration’s superficial commitment to its own narrative of “buen vivir.” With a clear legal
framework and calls not only to protect the Park, but the voluntarily isolated indigenous groups
protected by the constitution, Rafael Correa has prioritized capital over human needs, the state
over local.
The Yasuní ITT case, in this manner reinforces this idea of neo-extractivism. With the
failure of the ITT, the Correa administration immediately dismissed the idea that the
environment, should, or could be preserved or that there was even an alternative to drilling.
Rafael Correa justifies the drilling as a means to continue the social welfare programs he began,
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to continue to develop the nation and fight poverty through redistribution. He prioritizes the
majority and the state over local indigenous groups in a somewhat utilitarian fashion. This
reflects not a dedication to buen vivir, but to neo-extractivism, where the priorities solely lie in a)
extraction and b) redistribution. Other social factors and issues are not included. The Yasuní case
then becomes a clear example of the fundamental neo-extractivism in Ecuador’s development
strategies. The exclusion of marginalized groups highlights the almost dogmatic commitment to
extractivism.
Assertion of Sovereignty
Rafael Correa has been able to excuse these critiques of the Yasuní case study through
the structure of the ITT proposal. Through the international community’s failure to raise the
necessary funds, they become an easy target on which to blame the drilling on. Davidov
elaborates that the narrative extends so far as to “strategically construct [themselves] an image of
itself as a current [and] former victim of international institutions…” (Davidov, 2012, p. 12).
This discourse feeds into the anti-imperialism that Correa has used throughout his political
movement. It also frames oil as sovereignty, a medium over which Ecuador has autonomy.
Davidov explains “the very existence of the initiative has recast oil, which for so long has been
the symbol and the medium of ‘monster’ economies in Ecuador, as the symbol of Ecuador’s
autonomy over its natural resources, whether they will ultimately be used for the generation of
goods or the generation of value” (Davidov, 2012, p. 15). However the ironies of such an
assertion of sovereignty that continues the dependency of a primary economy on developed
states, with a transition from the US to China, demonstrates the administration’s complete
contradictions between its narratives and the realities of oil policies.
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Again, perhaps the solution to such a system that excludes marginalized groups is the
acceptance and inclusion of civil society. In the Yasuní case, there were many serious actions
taken by NGOs, activists, and citizens to stop the drilling in the ITT block in order to protect the
rights of both the Pachamama and the Tagaeri and Taromenane. Actions such as protesting and
the 2014 petition for a referendum have been dismissed by the Correa administration, and dissent
muzzled. The inclusion of the people’s voices, of civil society, in twenty-first century socialism
is necessary for it to guarantee buen vivir for all communities.
Conclusion
This thesis uses Yasuní ITT case study as a lens in which to examine Ecuador’s twentyfirst century socialist model and its development strategies. The clear contradictions between the
stated visions of twenty-first century socialism and the decision to drill in Yasuní Park gave us
insight into the contradictions of President Correa’s development model. What was new about
the twenty-first century socialist development strategy? Despite a stated commitment to new
legal framework, and the values of buen vivir and post-neoliberalism, the twenty-first century
socialist development model reflects policies similar to its recent neoliberal history.
Through the exploration of such values as buen vivir and post-neoliberalism, this paper
attempted to use these values, as seen in government documents put out by the Ecuadorean
Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo, as the goals of the twenty-first century
socialist development model. Through the understanding of these goals in reaching a diversified,
sustainable, socialist economy that protected human interests and the environment, it became
clearer whether the policies of Rafael Correa’s government matched these statements, or if rather
they reflected historical models of development. Instead of seeing a true commitment to these
values and a post-extractive alternative, Ecuador’s twenty-first century socialist model reflects
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little evidence of a changing system, but rather a continuation of historical development
strategies. This chapter was used to demonstrate the gap between twenty-first century socialist
values and goals and the reality of its continued extraction.
The historical models of development, and the legacy of oil, discussed in Chapter 3,
created a background for understanding the current Yasuní conflict and current development
models. Through the understanding of development strategies of I.S.I. and neoliberalism, one
can compare these to Rafael Correa’s current development model and truly reflect on their
differences. Though Correa’s administration has perhaps relied on both, via a heavy primary
economy and nationalization strategies, the current development strategy is not an alternative to
neoliberalism. It has still promoted heavy extractive policies, prioritized capital over human and
environmental interests, and is still using oil as a tool to reflect “ownership.”
However, Correa had made some policy changes that seemed to reflect this postneoliberal, buen vivir alternative. Through the establishment of social programs and the 2008
constitution that protect the rights of the Pachamama and indigenous groups, President Correa
demonstrates his “commitment” to buen vivir. His nationalization policies and his development
plan reflect post-neoliberal strategies dedicated to changing Ecuador’s primary agro-extractive
export economy. Lastly, his anti-imperial narrative is backed through the defaulting of “illegal”
debt and the creation of trade groups like ALBA. These policies and strategies are supposed to
demonstrate the development strategies of the twenty-first century socialist model. But rather,
they reflect the narrative and not the reality of the extractive model and Ecuador’s development.
Despite initial policy changes under the Correa administration, the study of data and
empirical trends demonstrate that not much has changed in Ecuador under the twenty-first
century development model. The continuation of oil policy and the inability to diversify reflects
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historical development strategies, rather than a post-neoliberal alternative. It also demonstrates
the development strategies commitment to capital, over human rights and the environment.
Through the continuation of extractive policies, it is a guarantee of environmental pollution and a
deterioration of human, mostly indigenous, health. Heavy oil policy also continues Ecuador’s
dependency on the United States. As U.S. is Ecuador’s largest buyer, Ecuador becomes
dependent on U.S. funds in this primary economy model. Oil therefore hinders the twenty-first
century model in upholding its values to post-neoliberalism, buen vivir, and anti-imperialism.
These contradictions between this narrative and the government’s policies reflect that
there has been no creation of a “new” development strategy at all, but rather a system of neoextractivism. Though this development model has attempted to alleviate the worst symptoms of
neoliberalism through social programs and legal framework, it is not a true alternative that can
uphold the values of the twenty-first century socialism movement. However, can these values be
upheld under any model? For a “developing” nation that exists within the neoliberal global
capitalist society, one questions whether it is possible for such a nation to break away from world
systems. It questions the ability of the Correa administration to implement true change in its
development model. In the same way, neoliberalism was implemented by Northern institutions,
will it have to be deconstructed in the same manner? Correa’s administration has at least
attempted to address the issues of neoliberalism, it is perhaps unfair to assess Correa’s
development strategies to the lofty goals of the movement, especially within his limited time
frame. How much power does Ecuador truly have in changing its own development path? The
assertion of sovereignty, through policies such as Yasuní, then becomes crucial to breaking
cycles of dependency.
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The Yasuní ITT case study functions as an example of twenty-first century socialism’s
development policy. Despite a new narrative and new legal framework, oil policy has relatively
remained the same. Yasuní -ITT demonstrates how the narrative; the protection of indigenous
groups, rights given to the environment, an assertion of sovereignty, and a commitment to
diversification strategies is rendered “secondary” to the primacy of oil extraction. Twenty-first
century socialist development strategies are corrupted with contradictions. The use of heavy oil
extraction as a policy, whether or not the Ecuadorean government has the power to control its
development strategy, prohibits this movement to achieve the credibility it needs to move
forward. Perhaps the future of Yasuní -ITT is already set, but the future of this movement is not.
If twenty-first century socialism is going to survive and develop a true “post-neoliberal
development strategy,” the inclusion of civil society to protect marginalized groups will be key.
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